India has once again pressed for progress on its projects in Sri Lanka, which continue to move at a snail’s pace despite repeated rounds of discussions. During his visit to Colombo this week, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri conveyed New Delhi’s concerns directly to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. He also raised the issue of the delayed provincial council elections and the need for a political settlement for the Tamil minority in the North and East.
In an earlier meeting with Dissanayake in New Delhi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi voiced frustration over the slow pace of implementation. Despite the rhetoric of “system change,” the National People’s Power government appears to be repeating the delays of its predecessors, particularly on India’s strategic projects in the North and East — areas of special concern for New Delhi. Why do these projects remain stalled, and does the old phrase “fear of the big brother” still linger in the background?
The JVP-led National People’s Power government seems aware of India’s importance as a resident power in the Indian Ocean, despite its historic hostility toward New Delhi. Since the Cold War era, India has consistently pursued major projects in Sri Lanka, even as relations swung between warmth and strain. According to the Indian High Commission in Colombo, India has provided more than US$7.5 billion in relief and development assistance, including US$850 million in outright grants, under its “Neighbourhood First” and “MahaSagar” policies.
India-funded projects span all 25 districts, covering transport, highways, urban development, ports, civil aviation, housing, water supply, fisheries, science and technology, and community initiatives. Yet the persistent delays in strategic projects remain a striking question in New Delhi, with no convincing answers from Colombo.
Against this backdrop, Colombo has moved to establish a special monitoring unit for India-funded projects — a decision taken after a review meeting between Labour Minister and Finance and Planning Deputy Minister Dr. Anil Jayantha Fernando and Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha, just before the Foreign Secretary’s visit. The move underscores the lack of progress and India’s growing impatience.
India’s connectivity projects, particularly in the North and East, remain frozen. During his landmark visit to Colombo — the first by an Indian Prime Minister since the Indo-Lanka Accord — Modi announced New Delhi’s vision for investment in Sri Lanka. “Today, Lanka IOC and Ceylon Petroleum Corporation have agreed to jointly develop the Upper Tank Farm of the China Bay Installation in Trincomalee on mutually agreed terms. A Joint Task Force will be constituted soon to work out the modalities. India stands ready to help Trincomalee become a regional petroleum hub,” Modi declared alongside then-President Maithripala Sirisena.
He also emphasized the ocean economy as a “new frontier” for both nations, announcing a Joint Task Force in that sector. A decade later, in April 2025, Sri Lanka, India, and the UAE signed a trilateral agreement to develop an energy hub in Trincomalee — a site long central to India’s national security concerns and enshrined in the Indo-Lanka Accord.
During the Rajapaksa era, however, China entrenched itself through large-scale projects such as Hambantota Port and Colombo Port City, raising alarms in Washington about potential military use.
For India, delays in its strategic projects are not merely bureaucratic setbacks but a matter of national security. Colombo’s motives remain opaque, but for New Delhi, a presence in Sri Lanka’s North and East is non-negotiable. If Sri Lanka is deliberately stalling India’s initiatives, the consequences could undermine its own economic ambitions and deepen regional tensions.
Sri Lanka’s strategic location along critical Indian Ocean shipping corridors is often described as a natural advantage. Yet this prospect has not materialized — the nation continues to struggle to lift itself economically. The descent into historic bankruptcy, even after massive Chinese investments, raises difficult questions about whether Beijing’s economic foothold has truly boosted Sri Lanka.
The lesson is stark: Sri Lanka’s location is both strength and vulnerability. Strategic geography attracts global powers, but without sound economic management, it leaves the nation exposed to geopolitical pressures and internal tensions.
For Colombo, the path forward lies in trusted economic cooperation. Strengthening ties with India — the region’s resident power — is arguably the only viable option to mitigate this vulnerability. After the bankruptcy, India’s US$4 billion support package demonstrated how indispensable New Delhi has become for Sri Lanka’s survival. In this sense, a stable partnership with India could transform Sri Lanka’s location from a liability into a genuine asset, anchoring both economic recovery and strategic security.
Given this background, India’s large-scale projects in the North and East — particularly in Trincomalee — stand as gateways for Sri Lanka’s economic revival. If implemented effectively, they could provide the momentum needed to convert geography into growth, and vulnerability into resilience.
