The vulnerability of submarine communication cables is emerging as a growing strategic concern in global geopolitics, with industry leaders warning that the real impact of emerging deep-sea sabotage capabilities may lie in psychological deterrence rather than physical disruption.
The chief executive of global internet service provider RETN, Tony O’Sullivan, has said that technologies capable of cutting deep-sea cables should be understood less for their destructive capacity and more for their role in shaping perception and uncertainty during periods of tension. Speaking in Hong Kong, he compared the strategic effect of such capabilities to nuclear deterrence, arguing that their significance is rooted in the threat of use rather than actual deployment.
O’Sullivan said the concept of cable-cutting technology does not need to result in large-scale damage to be effective in conflict scenarios. “It does not have quite the same devastating impact with a single use, but it is exactly like a nuclear weapon in a sense that it is not the actual use of it, [but] the threat of the use of it is the bigger issue,” he stated. He added that the presence of such capabilities can generate public unease and disrupt confidence in governmental and political systems by introducing uncertainty about infrastructure security.
His remarks come amid increasing international concern over the security of submarine cables, which form the backbone of global internet and communications traffic. The issue has prompted 17 Asian and European nations to expand cooperation on protecting seabed infrastructure and strengthening maritime security strategies in recent months. However, according to the report, the two largest maritime powers, China and the United States, were not part of this coordinated group.
The growing attention to undersea infrastructure security has been reinforced by broader geopolitical developments, including the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline and the development of new technologies such as a deep-sea cable cutter attributed in the report to China. These developments have contributed to a shifting perception of the seabed as an increasingly contested domain in international relations.
O’Sullivan argued that while deliberate cable cutting incidents have largely been rare and often accidental, the strategic implications of such tools extend beyond their physical use. He described the psychological dimension as central to their impact, suggesting that the awareness of potential disruption can itself function as a form of hybrid warfare.
He said the effect lies in “creating an unease in a population with the threat that something might actually happen, and therefore disturbing their normal operations of government or political system.” According to his remarks, the concern is not primarily the occurrence of cable cuts themselves, but rather how the possibility of such actions influences decision-making, stability, and public confidence.
The RETN chief also pointed to what he described as a broader misunderstanding of risk within global communications infrastructure. He said the greater threat to the internet ecosystem may stem not from sabotage capabilities alone, but from insufficient awareness of how networks are designed and how vulnerabilities are managed.
The comments reflect a wider trend of heightened attention to critical infrastructure security, particularly in domains that are physically remote but strategically essential. Submarine cables, which carry the vast majority of international data traffic, have increasingly become part of discussions around hybrid warfare, resilience, and geopolitical competition in contested maritime regions.
While the text does not indicate any confirmed large-scale attacks on undersea cables in this context, it highlights a growing focus among governments and industry leaders on deterrence, perception, and the psychological dimensions of infrastructure vulnerability in an interconnected global communications system.
