INTRODUCTION
In the future, managing overt but also informal support and more discrete contributions will be a challenge as nations carefully weigh up their internal and external equities and calibrate their level of commitment. The coalition will have relied as much upon intelligence and transfer of data, as well as access, basing and overflight authorities from regional partners such as Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others, as on the exquisite military hardware that downed the drones and missiles. At their core, coalitions are ad hoc, discretionary and formed for tactical action. This one was no different. While the tactical tools, US C2 structures and MEAD will endure, the political cost–benefit calculus of utilizing them under a coalition banner may shift. It remains to be seen whether proven operational success is enough to maintain or reconstitute this coalition effort in the future.
DIVERGENCE OF US-ISRAELI POLICIES ON PALESTINE ISUE
On Palestine, US and Israeli goals diverge. Israel has often fought wars against a clock set by the US. Israel’s leaders have generally known that there would come a point when Washington would press them to stop. Within days of the 7 October attacks, President Joe Biden flew to Tel Aviv, where he physically hugged Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and figuratively embraced the Israeli people. But he also carried a kind of clock in his warning not to succumb to vengeance and repeat the kinds of mistakes that he said America made after 9/11. Over the ensuing year the US, represented by CIA Director Bill Burns, has tried tirelessly to negotiate a ceasefire that would see the return of hostages and, the Americans hoped, a longer-term end to the war. Netanyahu has repeatedly rejected or reneged on agreements negotiated by US diplomats, who at times had to pretend that he endorsed them.
CHINA’S NUCLEARIZATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NUCLEAR ORDER
The conflict engulfing Middle East focuses on the impact of China’s first nuclear test, conducted on 16 October 1964, on global and regional nuclear politics. In particular, the chapter considers how the superpowers dealt with China’s entry into the nuclear club, as well as reactions in Japan, India, and Taiwan. It continues an argument outlined earlier in the book, namely that Maoist China helped facilitate—however inadvertently—the emergence of global nuclear order. During this period, a model for nuclear order promoted by the superpowers, and to which China was ostensibly opposed, eventually emerged. Towards the end of the decade, China abandoned previously championed ideas of socialist proliferation and retreated from stances that directly challenged global nuclear order so as to focus on building a credible nuclear deterrent.
US VETO OF UNSC RESOLUTION AGAINST ISRAEL AND INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT CASES AGAINST ISRAEL
The US vetoed several United Nations Security Council resolutions and protested against the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court cases against Israel. The net cost to US diplomatic credibility has been significant at a time when it is trying to rally international support for Ukraine. Jerusalem can spurn Washington for a number of reasons. First is the reasonable assumption that American support for Israel is, practically speaking, unconditional. Netanyahu and his far-right coalition partners have zero intention of doing anything to satisfy the United States’ hopes that the Gaza disaster will occasion a moral reckoning leading to Palestinian non-Hamas governance in Gaza and then a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank. On the contrary, they have done everything possible to make a Palestinian state impossible.
SAUDI-ISRAELI NORMALIZATION PROCESS STALLED ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD
Middle East conflict has stalled progress on a Saudi Arabia–Israel normalization agreement, as Saudi Arabia has explicitly preconditioned normalization on achieving tangible progress toward a Palestinian state. Although the Kingdom has deliberately not specified the progress required (partly to allow for greater input from the Palestinians), Israel has been explicit in rejecting a Palestinian state. Israel’s explicit rejection of Palestinian statehood complicates the Arab Gulf states’ involvement in Gaza’s post-conflict governance. Although the UAE – the Arab Gulf state with the closest ties to Israel – has expressed support for a ‘temporary international mission’ in Gaza once the conflict subsides, it has nevertheless ruled out its involvement without a Palestinian state or under a permanent Israeli occupation of Gaza. The scale of civilian suffering, and the West’s failure to deliver a ceasefire or criticize Israel, have provided an easy opportunity to amplify anti-Western narratives in the Global South. Russia has portrayed these events as a fundamental failure of US policy in the Middle East that reflects the decline of the Western-led international order. At the extraordinary G20 summit in November 2023 President Vladimir Putin criticized the double standard of condemning civilian suffering in Ukraine but not in Gaza. Other Russian voices have depicted Western support for Israel as a form of colonialism.
CHINA SUPPORTS TWO STATE SOLUTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE
But despite Russia’s claim to play a uniquely constructive role in the Middle East, the Israel–Hamas war has China capitalizes on the crisis. China’s position since the Hamas-led 7 October attacks on Israel has been characterized by continuity. China quickly expressed support for a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Beijing has complicated Russia’s diplomacy. Relations with Israel have sharply deteriorated, and Arab Gulf states are alarmed by the prospect of a wider war that draws in Iran – whose relationship with Russia, driven by the latter’s war needs in Ukraine, has deepened. Russian mediation between the Palestinian factions failed to create unity among them, demonstrating Moscow’s limited influence. Russia also made little headway in persuading global opinion that it offers an attractive alternative approach to the international order. Russia’s relations with Israel are worsening, despite Israel’s large Russian-origin population, partly due to Moscow’s defense cooperation with Tehran.
CHINA SEES AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSERT ITS DOMINANCE IN ASIA AS THE WEST’S ATTENTION SHIFTS FROM INDO-PACIFIC THEATER TO THE MIDDLE EAST
Chinese strategists see an opening to assert China’s dominance in Asia while the United States’ and the West’s attention shifts from the Indo-Pacific theatre to the Middle East. Chinese investments in regional infrastructure, its bilateral trade and its plans for a potential second base in the region could all be hampered by heightened instability. An all-out war that leads to the destruction of oil facilities in Iran and the Arab Gulf states or the disruption of trade through the Strait of Hormuz – causing high oil prices – is another matter of concern for Beijing. Perhaps the biggest risk for China is that Middle Eastern countries start to expect it to play a more hands-on role in stabilizing the region. Thus far, Beijing has benefitted from the US-backed regional security architecture, which has allowed China to expand its investments in the region. Any change to regional countries’ expectations of Chinese involvement, however, might challenge Beijing to step away from its comfortable position of neutrality and moving to an explicit goal of forcing Israel to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza before implementing one in Lebanon.
IS “NEW NORMAL” ACCEPTABLE IN MIDDLE EAST
The calculus for the future involves whether a steady-state ‘new normal’ is acceptable, the risks of further escalation and the potential ripple effects for other critical waterways and flashpoints around the world. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. The air-defense coalition: a one-off success? Martin Sampson Following a barrage of over 300 Iranian UAVs and cruise and ballistic missiles launched at Israel overnight on 13–14 April, the IDF claimed that a rapidly assembled coalition of aircraft and air defenses from France, Israel, Jordan, the UK, the US and other regional actors had prevented 99% of Iranian weapons from reaching their intended targets.
The reasons for the coalition’s remarkable success were threefold. Firstly, almost ten years’ involvement in counter-terrorism operations against the Islamic State (ISIS) meant that participating nations’ air and air-defense assets were readily available, and that the US was practiced at overcoming and integrating disparate rules of engagement, capabilities, political authorities and political sensitivities. Secondly, in September 2021, the US moved Israel from its European Command (EUCOM) to its Central Command (CENTCOM), cohering the practical issues of coordination, intelligence fusion and operational command-and-control (C2) across a broad Israel–Iran/Iranian proxy air, land and maritime threat axis. Thirdly, the US-led Middle East Air Defense (MEAD) alliance formed in 2022 provided Israel and Western and Arab nations the political cover to offer military capabilities for broad defensive mutual benefit. The strategic communications of France, Israel, the UK and the US, and, to a lesser extent, Jordan, amplified the strong tactical-level performance.
Importantly, the broad coalition messaging was aligned and emphasized superior operational capability, operational security and strategic solidarity with Israel. Iran portrayed the requirement for the coalition as Israeli weakness and an indication of Israel’s reliance upon its Western and regional partners for its defense. The strength of the commitment to maintain this coalition also came under scrutiny: would the coalition come together under different circumstances, or is the defense of Israel an absolute commitment? In the future, managing overt but also informal support and more discrete contributions will be a challenge as nations carefully weigh up their internal and external equities and calibrate their level of commitment.
The coalition will have relied as much upon intelligence and transfer of data, as well as access, basing and overflight authorities from regional partners such as Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others, as on the exquisite military hardware that downed the drones and missiles. At their core, coalitions are ad hoc, discretionary and formed for tactical action. This one was no different. While the tactical tools, US C2 structures and MEAD will endure, the political cost–benefit calculus of utilizing them under a coalition banner may shift. It remains to be seen whether proven operational success is enough to maintain or reconstitute this coalition effort in the future. On Palestine, US and Israeli goals diverge Dana H. Allin Israel has often fought wars against a clock set by the US. Israel’s leaders have generally known that there would come a point when Washington would press them to stop.
DIVERGENCE IN US-ISRAELI POLICIES ON PALESTINE ISSUE
Within days of the 7 October attacks, President Joe Biden flew to Tel Aviv, where he physically hugged Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and figuratively embraced the Israeli people. But he also carried a kind of clock in his warning not to succumb to vengeance and repeat the kinds of mistakes that he said America made after 9/11. Over the ensuing year the US, represented by CIA Director Bill Burns, has tried tirelessly to negotiate a ceasefire that would see the return of hostages and, the Americans hoped, a longer-term end to the war. The Biden administration has repeatedly claimed that negotiations were on the verge of success. But it is by now abundantly clear that Israel’s government could not care less about the American clock. Netanyahu has repeatedly rejected or reneged on agreements negotiated by US diplomats, who at times had to pretend that he endorsed them. When the US The Israel–Hamas war one year on 9announced the suspension of one kind of weapons sale, Netanyahu denounced it as ‘unconscionable’.
US VETOES ANTI-ISRAEL UN STANCE
The US vetoed several United Nations Security Council resolutions and protested against the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court cases against Israel. The net cost to US diplomatic credibility has been significant at a time when it is trying to rally international support for Ukraine. Jerusalem can spurn Washington for a number of reasons. First is the reasonable assumption that American support for Israel is, practically speaking, unconditional. It is not clear when, exactly, it became de rigor for US presidents, or aspiring presidents, to express extravagant devotion to Israel. This was not the way presidents spoke in the Richard Nixon era. There is irony in this fealty insofar as the respective goals and worldviews of the two allies have never been further apart.
Netanyahu and his far-right coalition partners have zero intention of doing anything to satisfy the United States’ hopes that the Gaza disaster will occasion a moral reckoning leading to Palestinian non-Hamas governance in Gaza and then a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank. On the contrary, they have done everything possible to make a Palestinian state impossible. The project of ensuring this impossibility, which started well before the current war, continues apace with expanded settlements and the physical infrastructure of annexation in the West Bank. If this creates a long-term American problem, Netanyahu’s short-term solution is Trump’s return to the White House. While it is not obvious whether a Kamala Harris administration would be willing or able to bend Israel more effectively to the American will, it is perfectly clear that a Trump administration would not even try. Or, to be more precise, its view of the Palestinians would be easily compatible with the views of Netanyahu and his two Greater Israel coalition partners.
PROSPECT OF PERMANENT CEASEFIRE IS ELUSIVE
As the prospect of a permanent ceasefire in Gaza has remained elusive, Qatar has expressed its frustration with the warring parties’ unyielding stances and Netanyahu’s calls for pressure to be applied on Doha to help bring Hamas to yield, warning it was reconsidering its role as a mediator. The other Arab Gulf states have remained on the margins of the conflict, lending their support to Egypt and Jordan against proposed Israeli war plans. The Arab Gulf states have remained neutral in the confrontation between Israel and the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. They have adopted a defensive posture, intercepting Houthi missiles and drones that violated their airspace and facilitating US-led efforts to intercept Iran’s drone and missile attacks against Israel in April 2024.
SAUDI ARABIA-ISRAEL NORMALIZATION STALLED DUE TO ISRAELI REJECTION OF A TANGIBLE PALESTINAN STATE
Meanwhile, the conflict involving Iran has stalled progress on a Saudi Arabia–Israel normalization agreement, as Saudi Arabia has explicitly preconditioned normalization on achieving tangible progress toward a Palestinian state. Although the Kingdom has deliberately not specified the progress required (partly to allow for greater input from the Palestinians), Israel has been explicit in rejecting a Palestinian state. Israel’s explicit rejection of Palestinian statehood complicates the Arab Gulf states’ involvement in Gaza’s post-conflict governance. Although the UAE – the Arab Gulf state with the closest ties to Israel – has expressed support for a ‘temporary international mission’ in Gaza once the conflict subsides, it has nevertheless ruled out its involvement without a Palestinian state or under a permanent Israeli occupation of Gaza.
