The Army’s transformation from largely a ceremonial role to a fighting force cannot be examined without taking into consideration the ongoing controversy over the alleged involvement of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) in the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage.
Every effort should be made to ascertain the truth and punish those responsible in case the then Brigadier Suresh Sally, who had not been with DMI at the time of the near simultaneous suicide attacks, and stationed in our mission in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, engineered the project to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the presidential election as asserted by their enemies.
Suresh Sally, who later served as the head of State Intelligence Service during Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s tenure as the President has successfully disputed the primary allegation that he secretly left Malaysia to meet the Easter Sunday suicide squad at a coconut estate in the Puttalam district. Sally’s case is just another example the Army failed as an institution to address issues thereby leaving individual officers to fight their own battles. The recent harassment of retired Maj. Gen. Kithsiri Ekanayake by the Beliatta Police on the false charge of killing a woman to secure a buried treasure in the deep South is another example of utterly unfair and irresponsible action by our law enforcement.
The country’s rightfully proud Army celebrates its 76th anniversary in October this year with some of its illustrious officers placed under a cloud with regard to their conduct during the war by those who cannot stomach their dream victory over the LTTE, achieved despite various attempts made by powerful Western nations to deny us that worthy triumph over the world’s most ruthless terrorist organisation, even acknowledged by the American Federal Bureau of Investigation. Successive governments, including the war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa administration, failed to address accountability issues properly, especially in the face of even powerful international bodies, like the UNHCR, blindly towing the Western line to hound us, thereby creating an environment conducive for those seeking to target military and political leaders.
The war-winning Army never really pushed governments to take up the accountability issues seriously though the matter had been taken up occasionally. The military’s situation is summed up by Tennyson’s epic poem “The Charge of the Light Brigade,” in the lines, “Theirs not to make reply, Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die”. Annual celebrations and religious events hadn’t been able to cover up the pathetic failure on the part of the Army to set the record straight.
No one has explained the crisis experienced by the Army better than Gajaba Regiment veteran Chagie Gallage. Having retired on 31 August, 2018, Gallage, in his farewell speech, delivered a week later at Gajaba home, at Saliyapura, Anuradhapura, highlighted his predicament as well as those of his colleagues.
Speaking on the eve of the 35th anniversary of the Gajaba Regiment, the strategist declared: “Gajaba was engraved in golden letters of the annals of the history of the Sri Lanka Army, if not in the history of Sri Lanka … and I’m certain it will never to be reversed by any. So, I’m happy to be retired being a tiny particle of that proud chapter of history, though designated as a ‘War Criminal.”
Among those who had been present at that occasion was the then Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva set to become the Commander in the following year. Shavendra Silva, also of the celebrated Gajaba Regiment, was sanctioned two years later after he succeeded Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanaayke. The UK sanctioned him in April this year.
Gallage was responding to Australia denying him visa for a visit between December 2016 and January 2017. Australia found fault with Gallage for commanding the 59 Division from 07 May, 2009 to 20 July, 2009. Throughout the war against the LTTE, in both the Northern and Eastern theatres, Gallage played a critical and exceptional role, including at the Anandapura battle in the first week of April 2009 that crippled the LTTE’s conventional fighting capacity.
The combined armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion in May 2009. But for want of a cohesive strategy, the Army, Navy and Air Force never took a joint stand. Unprecedented political upheaval caused by war-winning Army Chief General Sarath Fonseka challenging Commander-in-Chief Mahinda Rajapaksa at the 2010 presidential election wrong footed the armed forces. That, too, undermined the overall defence against war crimes accusations. The now-defunct The Sunday Leader exploited Fonseka in an interview. Having accused Fonseka of killing The Sunday Leader Editor Lasantha Wickrematunga, the paper quoted the Sinha Regiment veteran as having said the 58 Division carried out field executions. By then, the Rajapaksas had exacerbated the situation by dismissing 35 senior officers as alleged by Fonseka at a public meeting in Matara on 05 October. The Rajapaksas owed the country an apology for the way they arrested Fonseka on the night of 08 February, 2010, by soldiers who stormed his political office at 1/3 Rajakeeya Mawatha (formerly Reid Avenue) near Royal College, in Colombo 7. On the eve of the Army’s 76th anniversary, the best ever Army commander launched a scathing attack on the Rajapaksas, alleging the former President Mahinda Rajapaksa of treachery.
SLA targeted
Against the backdrop of the pathetic handling of accountability issues, the UN and countries individually took action. No less a person than Ali Sabry, PC, in his capacity as the Foreign Minister in September 2022, explained the situation when the writer raised the issue at a media briefing, called by the Foreign Ministry to explain the developments with the focus on staff-level agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with regard to USD 2.9 billion loan facility and the Geneva sessions.
Sabry declared that the entire fighting divisions, which fought on the Vanni front during Eelam War IV (2006-2009), had been ‘blacklisted’ on the basis of obviously predetermined findings made by the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).
The failure on the part of Parliament to address accountability is a mystery. However, Parliament, over the years, enacted laws which addressed the concerns of the UN and Western powers with regard to accountability issues. But, never took any meaningful measures to have the unsubstantiated war crimes allegations investigated. Instead, Parliament, in early February 2023, honoured Ban Ki-moon who, in his capacity as the Secretary General of the United Nations, set the stage for the planned attack on Sri Lanka by producing a hatchet report that found fault with the Army by his handpicked panel of experts with no chance given to either the Army or the country to reply.
In spite of wild allegations levelled against our victorious armed forces, as the war was brought to a successful conclusion, the UN had faith in the capabilities of our battle-tested military by continuing to deploy Sri Lankan troops, under its command, in several countries. That is an achievement the country can be proud of. Even during the height of war, the Army remained committed to UN deployments.
It would be pertinent to mention those who commanded the Army, after Fonseka’s retirement (December 6, 2006 to July 15, 2009). Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya (July 15, 2009, to July 31, 2013, Lt. Gen. Daya Ratnayake (August 1, 2013, to February 21, 2015), Lt. Gen. C de Silva (February 22, 2015, to June 26, 2017), Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake (June 27, 2017, to August 18, 2019), Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva (August 19, 2019, to May 31, 2022), Lt. Gen. Vikum Liyanage (June 1, 2022, to December 30, 2024) and the incumbent is Lt. Gen. Lasantha Rodrigo. Of those who commanded fighting Divisions on the northern front, during Eelam War IV, only Shavendra Silva received the opportunity to command the proud Army. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa replaced him with another Gajaba officer Vikum Liyanage soon after 09 May counter violence triggered by the senseless Temple Trees directive to SLPP goons to break up the Galle Face protest. When Galle Face protesters overran the Janadhipathi Mandiraya, forcing President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee Colombo, by sea, to Trincomalee, Liyanage had been in command of the Army.
UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, who picked Fonseka, in consultation with the TNA and the JVP, as the common candidate at the 2010 presidential election, betrayed his own war-winning Army, five years later, when his government treacherously co-sponsored the accountability resolution at the Geneva Human Rights Council. The US Embassy, during Patricia Butenis tenure, played a critical role in the formation of that alliance. The then President Maithripala Sirisena cannot, under any circumstances, absolve himself of culpability for allowing that to happen. President Sirisena assured the Army that he would take remedial measures. But he did nothing. In fact, the US refused to issue a visa to Fonseka who was to accompany Sirisena for the UN General Assembly.
The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo set the stage for the humiliation of the armed forces. First they cancelled the annual victory day celebrations. There had never been a previous instance of a government here, or in any part of the world, co-sponsoring an accountability resolution against its own Army. The UN led process has reached a crucial stage with the National People’s Power (NPP) government going ahead with plans to establish an independent prosecutor’s office. Among those involved in deliberations in this regard are Attorney General Parinda Ranasinghe (Jnr), PC and President of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, Rajeev Amarasuriya.
Glorious victories
The Army spearheaded combined armed forces campaigns against the JVP insurrection in 1971 and during its second most violent attempt to grab power between 1987-1990, and separatist Tamil terrorism. In spite of the JVP receiving some backing from a few soldiers, the Marxist party could never inspire the military. The Army played a significant role in overcoming the JVP challenge during the tenures of President J. R. Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa. The systematic elimination of the JVP leadership brought the second terror campaign to an end by early 1990. The JVP couldn’t sustain operations after the execution of Rohana Wijeweera within 24 hours after his capture by the Army in the second week of November, 1989. Of the top JVP leadership, only Somawansa Amarasinghe managed to escape those hunting for him. Amarasinghe returned home in late 2001 following 12 years of self-imposed exile. On his return, Amarasinghe profusely thanked India, particularly its intelligence services, for helping him escape.
The Army suffered debacles on the northern front due to Premadasa’s reckless political strategies. Debilitating setbacks suffered in the North caused deterioration of security in the East. President Premadasa had been so foolish that he went to the extent of ordering the Army to surrender. If not for the intrepid leadership of Lt. Col Hiran Halangoda, the then Commanding Officer of the first battalion of Gemunu Watch, the East, too, would have been lost. Premadasa actually funded the LTTE to the tune of Rs 125 mn, in addition to providing arms and ammunition. Even after the LTTE murdered several hundred police personnel, who had surrendered to it on the instructions of the President, the funding continued.
Retired Army Commander Daya Ratnayake in his memoirs ‘Sri Lankawe Bedumwadi Thrasthawadaya 1975-2009’ (Separatist Terrorism in Sri Lanka 1975 to 2009) recalled the treacherous actions of the UNP government. What the Army did, at the behest of Premadasa who simply bent backwards to appease the LTTE, was unthinkable.
The then Major Ratnayake had been at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH), Colombo, when fighting erupted in the East, in the second week of June, 1990. The author had been the duty officer at the JOH. Ratnayake is, perhaps, one of the few military personnel to observe the then State Defence Minister, late Ranjan Wijeratne, Defence Secretary the late General Cyril Ranatunga, and then IGP, the late Ernest Perera, issuing orders from JOH for the armed forces, and police, to surrender to the LTTE.
Ratnayake named Lt. Colonel Hiran Halangode as the one who refused to heed the treacherous directive issued by the JOH. Sri Lanka never bothered to examine the conduct of political and military leadership during the conflict. Even 17 years after the conclusion of the war, no government took tangible measures to conduct a thorough examination of the conflict.
The political and military leadership should be held responsible for the overall weakening of the armed forces that resulted in the loss of a stretch of road, north of Vavuniya, right up to Elephant Pass, in 1990. That road couldn’t be totally regained in spite of several efforts, including the costly Jayasikurui operation conducted during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President.
Finally, the Army regained that stretch of road in January 2009. That marked the completion of ground operations on the western part of the Vanni as the Army stepped up the offensive on the area east of Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road. Some of the fiercest battles of the Eelam War IV were fought in the Vanni east. Army Headquarters records reveal that as many as 2,400 officers and men perished in the Vanni east theatre where the LTTE mounted several counter attacks and at one point breached the frontline defences in February 2009 and managed to unsettle the Army. But, the Army fought valiantly to turn around the situation. By March 2009, the Army was set for the kill. During the campaign (August 2006 to May 2009) nearly 6,300 made the supreme sacrifice while about 30,000 suffered injuries.
A desperate bid to save LTTE
A few weeks before that, Norway made a desperate bid to save the LTTE. That attempt had been made while the US was exploring the possibility of evacuating the LTTE leadership. The then Norwegian Ambassador Tore Hattrem, in a note dated 16 February, 2009, sent to Basil Rajapaksa, expressed concern over the fate of those trapped on the Vanni east front. Hattrem’s note to Basil Rajapaksa revealed Norway’s serious concern over the LTTE’s refusal to release the civilians. Those who stupidly believed in the LTTE’s capacity to overwhelm the Army on the Vanni east front, were quite shocked when troops forced them to retreat on all fronts.
The following is the Norwegian note, headlined ‘Offer/Proposal to the LTTE’, and personally signed by Ambassador Hattrem:” I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it doesn’t seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.”
The ICRC recognised the sacrifices made by the Army. But successive governments, as well as the Army Headquarters, lacked prudence to exploit the ICRC’s declaration.
Let me reproduce a secret US cable that was disclosed by WikiLeaks. The cable had been signed by US Ambassador to Geneva, Clint Williamson, on 15 July, 2009. Having met Jacque de Maio, ICRC Head of Operations for South Asia on 09 July, 2009, two months after the end of the war, the Ambassador wrote: “The Army was determined not to let the LTTE escape from its shrinking territory, even though this meant the civilians being kept hostage by the LTTE were at increasing risk. So, de Maio said, while one could safely say that there were ‘serious, widespread violations of IHL,’ by the Sri Lankan forces, it did not amount to genocide. He could cite examples of where the Army had stopped shelling when ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the Army actually could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet chosen a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths (emphasis is mine) He concluded, however, by asserting that the GSL failed to recognise its obligation to protect civilians, despite the approach leading to higher military casualties. From his standpoint, a soldier at war should be more likely to die than a civilian.”
Perhaps, Army Headquarters never realised the importance of ICRC’s declaration. Maybe no one in command really wanted to take it up with the political leadership.
A former colleague of mine, now overseas, in response to a recent article, under the Midweek series, pointed out how President Mahinda Rajapaksa contributed to the developing Geneva situation by not implementing Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) recommendations. He emphasised that it wouldn’t be fair to always allege external conspiracies and interventions, the TNA and Tamil Diaspora for pushing for war crimes investigations, when the President himself failed in his responsibility. The writer fully appreciates that opinion. The former President owed the country an explanation as his failure obviously made things difficult for the war-winning Army.
Sri Lanka never wanted to set the record straight. Successive governments played politics with the issue. In fact, war crimes narratives collapsed on the day the TNA declared its support for General Fonseka’s candidature at the 2010 presidential election and the Tamil electorate overwhelmingly voted for him. Fonseka won all predominantly Tamil-speaking electoral districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces though the rest of the country overwhelmingly rejected him. Fonseka lost by a staggering 1.8 mn votes. That defeat actually ended opportunities for him to advance his political career though once UNP leader Wickremesinghe, for reasons best known to him, accommodated Fonseka in his Yahapalana Cabinet-of-Ministers (2015-2019). That happened because M.K.D.S. Gunawardena, appointed to Parliament, passed away suddenly.
