As terrorist violence continues to exact a devastating toll across Africa, governments and international partners are relying increasingly on airstrikes to contain militant networks. While critics argue that aerial campaigns cannot dismantle extremist organisations and risk fuelling further radicalisation through civilian casualties, recent operations suggest that carefully targeted airpower can disrupt terrorist command structures, deter fighters, and provide indispensable battlefield support.
Despite mounting criticism over civilian casualties, airstrikes have become a defining feature of counterterrorism operations across Africa, reflecting a strategic shift by governments seeking to confront increasingly sophisticated terrorist organisations. From the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin to Somalia, aerial campaigns have assumed a central role in efforts to weaken extremist groups operating across what remains the global epicentre of terrorism-related deaths. Yet the expanding reliance on kinetic operations has intensified debate over whether airpower can achieve lasting security gains or merely deliver temporary tactical victories while creating new risks.
According to analysis by The Soufan Center, airstrikes alone cannot eliminate terrorist organisations, nor can they substitute for the comprehensive political, military, and social strategies required to combat violent extremism effectively. Nevertheless, when employed selectively and judiciously, they can make meaningful contributions to broader counterterrorism campaigns. Airstrikes can deter terrorist groups, temporarily disrupt their command-and-control capabilities, and provide vital close air support for local armed forces, often saving the lives of soldiers confronting large-scale militant assaults.
The expansion of aerial operations has been particularly evident in Somalia. The Trump administration conducted more strikes in Somalia than the Bush, Obama, and Biden administrations combined, carrying out 126 strikes in 2025 alone. The United States is not alone in relying on airpower. Türkiye has expanded its own kinetic campaign against al-Shabaab by deploying three F-16 fighter jets to Mogadishu, while Sahelian armies and their Russian supporters increasingly depend on aircraft and drones to target terrorist and insurgent groups. The rapid spread of drone technology has also reshaped the battlefield from another direction, with terrorist organisations themselves successfully deploying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against their adversaries.
Yet the growing reliance on airpower has been accompanied by persistent criticism. The two principal arguments advanced by opponents are that airstrikes have limited effectiveness in dismantling terrorist organisations and that civilian casualties resulting from such operations may strengthen extremist movements rather than weaken them. Civilian deaths can become powerful propaganda tools, potentially radicalising individuals who previously had no affiliation with terrorist organisations and encouraging the recruitment of new fighters and supporters.
Recent examples illustrate these concerns. The killing of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) leader Abu-Bilal al-Minuki in Nigeria has been cited by experts as an operation that failed to alter the broader structure or long-term survival of the organisation. Similar assessments emerged following U.S. airstrikes against al-Shabaab in Somalia in 2019, when Kenyan scholar and human rights advocate Shadrack Gutto argued that aerial operations alone could neither resolve the objectives of the warring parties nor bring lasting peace to the country.
Such criticisms underscore an important reality: eliminating senior commanders, training camps, or other high-value targets cannot, by itself, eradicate deeply rooted extremist organisations. Countering violent extremism across Africa requires a far more comprehensive strategy than military force alone.
Even so, the operational impact of airstrikes extends beyond the elimination of individual leaders. Intensified aerial campaigns can alter the behaviour of terrorist organisations by demonstrating that not only senior commanders but also lower-ranking members are vulnerable. In Somalia, the easing of rules of engagement during the first and second Trump administrations expanded the range of targets from key leaders to mid- and lower-ranking fighters. Combined with the increasing presence of Turkish, Kenyan, Ethiopian, and UAE drones and combat aircraft, the message became unmistakable: virtually any member of a terrorist organisation could become a target regardless of rank or location.
That shift forced al-Shabaab to adapt. The group reportedly abandoned large gatherings of senior leaders and imposed stricter controls over internal communications to reduce its vulnerability to aerial surveillance and strikes. Similar behavioural changes emerged elsewhere. Following a surprise U.S. airstrike on 26 December 2025 against alleged Islamic State–Sahel/Lakurawa camps in northwestern Nigeria, local sources contacted by the author of The Soufan Center’s IntelBrief reported that fighters who had previously believed themselves beyond the reach of airpower fled northwards to avoid further attacks. While these developments did not amount to the defeat of the organisations involved, they demonstrated how airstrikes can temporarily weaken operational coherence and disrupt militant activities.
Beyond targeting terrorist networks directly, airpower has increasingly compensated for the limited military capabilities of many African states. In countries including Somalia, Niger, and Mali, American, French, Russian, Turkish, and other aircraft and UAVs have filled critical capability gaps by providing essential close air support to forces under attack. This role has become increasingly significant as violent extremist organisations have shifted towards more conventional military tactics, launching coordinated assaults involving hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of fighters against military installations across the continent.
For governments lacking the infrastructure or resources to reinforce isolated positions rapidly, close air support often represents the only effective means of preventing military bases from being overrun. Aircraft, drones, and helicopters are capable of delivering concentrated firepower against massed attacking forces while also destroying Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs), which pose a particularly grave threat during large-scale assaults and in densely populated urban areas.
The effectiveness of airpower, however, varies significantly across different theatres of operation. Analysis by The Soufan Center indicates that aerial operations have generally proved more effective in Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin than in the Western Sahel. Geography plays a decisive role. During Operation Hilaac and fighting around Mogadishu and Benadir in early 2025, drones and combat aircraft operated relatively close to battlefields spread across only a few hundred square kilometres, allowing rapid responses to emerging threats.
The operational environment in the Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger tri-border region presents a markedly different challenge. The vast Liptako Gourma region extends across more than 500,000 square kilometres, enabling terrorist groups to move quickly over immense distances and launch attacks from locations hundreds of kilometres away. Such conditions leave only a narrow window in which airpower can be deployed effectively, often meaning strikes occur after attacks have taken place in an effort to limit further damage or destroy surviving military assets before extremists can reuse them. Even within the Sahel, however, more geographically confined operations, such as Russian military and helicopter escorts accompanying fuel convoys to Bamako, demonstrate that airpower can still serve as an effective operational tool.
Despite these advantages, the limitations remain substantial. Maintaining sustained strike capabilities imposes significant financial costs on military forces, while avoiding civilian casualties over extended campaigns becomes increasingly difficult. In recent years, both the United States and Türkiye have faced accusations of causing civilian deaths during airstrikes in Somalia. Such incidents risk undermining broader counterterrorism objectives by providing extremist organisations with propaganda opportunities capable of attracting additional recruits and resources. Excessive dependence on airpower may also discourage investment in other critical military capabilities, including stronger defensive fortifications, mobile quick-reaction forces, and infrastructure such as road-clearing capacity.
As terrorist organisations across Africa continue to field thousands of fighters, the analysis suggests that occasional, selective airstrikes are likely to remain an integral component of counterterrorism operations. Airpower has eliminated hundreds of militants while protecting soldiers and civilians from attacks, including those involving Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIEDs). Yet the broader lesson remains clear. Airstrikes are a valuable instrument within governments’ counterterrorism toolboxes, capable of shaping battlefield conditions and supporting wider military operations, but they cannot, on their own, destroy extremist organisations. Sustainable success depends on integrating airpower into a comprehensive strategy capable of addressing both the immediate security threat and the enduring drivers of violent extremism.
