Germany and four other European Union countries are preparing to send rejected asylum seekers to Rwanda from 2027, presenting the arrangement as a new instrument for controlling irregular migration. The agreement, involving Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Greece, is intended to cover people whose countries of origin refuse to take them back or who do not cooperate with their return. Yet the plan has already attracted criticism over its likely cost, limited capacity and the political assumptions behind outsourcing deportations to a country thousands of kilometres away.
In an analysis published by the German weekly Die Zeit, the proposed arrangement is described as another expensive miscalculation in European migration policy. The article argues that the agreement offers governments the appearance of decisive action without addressing the practical obstacles to deportation or the reasons people continue to seek refuge in Europe.
German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt has called the arrangement an “innovative solution”, while Austrian Chancellor Christian Stocker has described it as a “historic paradigm shift” that would allow European governments to regain control of migration policy. Under the proposed scheme, Rwanda would function as a return hub, receiving people who cannot be returned directly to their countries of origin.
The scale of the arrangement, however, appears modest. Rwanda is expected to accommodate a maximum of several hundred people from the five participating EU countries in 2027, while millions of euros in public funds are expected to be directed towards the agreement. Critics argue that the limited number of transfers makes the scheme an expensive political gesture rather than a practical response to the wider difficulties facing European asylum systems.
The deterrence argument is equally contested. Supporters of external processing and deportation arrangements maintain that the prospect of being sent to a third country could encourage rejected asylum seekers already in Europe to leave voluntarily and discourage potential migrants from making the journey in the first place. The Die Zeit analysis questions whether such a threat would have much influence on people prepared to undertake dangerous journeys in search of safety or better prospects.
Previous experience involving Rwanda provides grounds for that scepticism. Between 2014 and 2017, approximately 1,500 Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers were transferred from Israel to Rwanda and Uganda. According to research cited in the article, many subsequently found themselves without adequate documentation or economic prospects. Under pressure from local authorities, a large number moved towards Libya, hoping eventually to reach Europe across the Mediterranean. The experience suggests that transferring people to another country does not necessarily end their attempts to reach their intended destination.
Rwanda has developed a broader diplomatic role through agreements to receive migrants and deportees from other countries. It previously reached an arrangement with the United Kingdom, which sought to relocate asylum procedures there. That policy was blocked by British courts in 2023, after the government in London had already spent several hundred million pounds on the project. Last year, Rwanda also agreed to receive 250 third-country nationals deported from the United States. The agreement with the five European countries would extend this approach further.
For Kigali, such arrangements offer more than financial compensation. They provide international recognition and diplomatic legitimacy to a government that has sought to present Rwanda as a stable and economically developing country following the 1994 genocide. Under President Paul Kagame, Rwanda has recorded significant economic progress and taken measures against corruption. However, the government has also faced sustained criticism over the suppression of political opposition and its military involvement in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo.
Rwanda’s role in the conflict in eastern Congo is particularly relevant to the migration debate. For decades, Kigali has been accused of supporting armed groups operating across the border. United Nations experts and human rights organisations have documented allegations of serious abuses by Congolese militias allied with Rwanda, including massacres, sexual violence and looting. One such militia currently controls resource-rich areas in eastern Congo, contributing to further displacement and the movement of illegally extracted gold and coltan into Rwanda.
The Die Zeit analysis identifies a wider contradiction in European migration policy: governments are increasingly relying on agreements with states and political actors whose actions are linked to the conflicts and instability that generate displacement in the first place.
Egypt and Tunisia have received European funding to prevent migrants and refugees from reaching Europe, despite serious concerns about governance and human rights in both countries. In Libya, armed groups and local power brokers have benefited from European support for efforts to intercept migrant boats. Some of the same networks have also been accused of involvement in smuggling operations, allowing them to profit from both sides of the migration system. Such arrangements, the article argues, can give local actors leverage over European governments by allowing them to threaten renewed migration flows.
Rwanda is not directly comparable to Libya’s fragmented system of armed groups or Egypt’s entrenched political and institutional problems. Nevertheless, its involvement in the conflict in eastern Congo raises questions about the consistency of European policy. The article compares the decision to make such a government a partner in migration control to giving a fire extinguisher to someone accused of starting the fire.
The political direction of the agreement is another central concern. The proposed return hub is based on the EU’s new Return Regulation, which was approved by the European Parliament last June with the support of the centre-right European People’s Party and the far right. During the vote, far-right members of the Parliament chanted “Send them back”, reflecting the growing influence of anti-immigration politics in European debates.
The article argues that migration policy has increasingly been shaped by political movements that portray refugees and migrants as the source of a wide range of social and economic problems, rather than by approaches focused on workable return procedures, international cooperation and human rights.
Germany currently has approximately 250,000 people under an obligation to leave the country. Nearly 80 per cent of them — around 200,000 — hold temporary tolerated status, meaning they cannot presently be deported. The distinction matters because the challenge is not simply a lack of facilities in third countries. Governments must also secure travel documents, establish identities and negotiate with countries of origin willing to readmit their nationals.
The Die Zeit analysis argues that direct negotiations with countries of origin to secure the acceptance of returning citizens and the issuance of identity documents may achieve more than expensive deportation centres abroad. Such diplomatic work, however, offers fewer opportunities for political spectacle.
It also calls for renewed attention to addressing the causes of forced migration. European governments, the article maintains, cannot expect migration pressures to diminish while reducing humanitarian assistance and development funding or failing to exert meaningful pressure on actors implicated in conflicts, including the United Arab Emirates in Sudan and Rwanda in eastern Congo.
Rwanda itself hosts approximately 140,000 refugees from conflicts across the region. Their living conditions are threatened by substantial cuts to humanitarian assistance, including funding for the World Food Programme. Rather than spending millions on a new deportation arrangement, the article suggests that European governments could direct some of those resources towards supporting refugees already living in camps in Rwanda.
The dispute over the return hub therefore reflects a wider question about the direction of European migration policy. Governments face genuine challenges in enforcing deportation decisions and managing asylum systems, but transferring responsibility to third countries does not necessarily resolve those difficulties. Without effective cooperation with countries of origin, sustained humanitarian support and serious engagement with the conflicts driving displacement, the proposed agreement risks becoming another costly initiative whose political message is considerably larger than its practical results.

