Former Syrian regime insiders living in exile in Moscow are spending millions of dollars to build rival fighting forces with the goal of igniting an uprising along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, according to a months-long Reuters investigation based on interviews with 48 people, internal documents, financial records, and photos.
The two central figures—former military intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan and billionaire Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of Bashar al-Assad—are vying for influence over tens of thousands of Alawite fighters and competing for control of 14 underground command rooms packed with weapons and communications gear. The facilities, constructed during the final months of Assad’s rule, were confirmed to Reuters by two Syrian officers and a regional governor.
Syria’s new government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, has deployed its own former Assad loyalist to counter the exiles’ plans: Khaled al-Ahmad, once a childhood friend and later an estranged paramilitary commander. His task is to quell discontent and persuade Alawites that their future lies with the post-Assad state.
A struggle for Syria’s coastal heartland
The Reuters investigation found that Hassan and Makhlouf—once among Assad’s closest confidants—are each bankrolling militias in Syria and Lebanon made up largely of Alawites, the minority sect that formed the backbone of the old regime. Internal documents from both camps claim a combined total of more than 50,000 fighters, though Reuters could not independently verify the numbers or confirm concrete battle plans.
Assad’s younger brother Maher, also in exile in Moscow, still commands loyalty from thousands of former elite soldiers but has not yet thrown his weight behind either faction, sources close to the family told Reuters.
Control of the underground command-room network is a central prize. Photos reviewed by Reuters show stacks of crates packed with AK-47 rifles, grenades and ammunition, as well as maps, computers, walkie-talkies and power systems. While operational, the sites have mostly sat idle since Assad’s fall in December 2024.
Rival visions: intelligence strongman vs. self-styled messianic figure
Reuters reviewed hundreds of voice messages and communications in which Hassan rages about his lost influence and urges followers to prepare for an armed return to the coast. He has spent roughly $1.5 million since March on salaries for 12,000 fighters in Syria and Lebanon, according to his operations coordinator.
Makhlouf, once Syria’s most powerful businessman, now promotes himself as a messianic figure in line with Shiite apocalyptic prophecy, according to his communications reviewed by Reuters. Financial documents and receipts show he has funneled at least $6 million to officers and fighters across Homs, Hama, Tartous and Latakia—though many recipients told Reuters the payments amount to little more than $20–$30 per month.
His deputies claim to command more than 54,000 fighters. Five local commanders on his payroll told Reuters they believed the total number of men willing to fight was far lower.
Both men operate from Moscow under tight security. Neither responded to requests for comment. Attempts by Reuters to reach Bashar and Maher al-Assad were unsuccessful.
A fractured Alawite landscape
The power struggle comes at a volatile moment for Syria’s Alawites, who suffered heavily under the old regime and in recent waves of sectarian violence. Nearly 1,500 Alawites were killed in March in reprisals following a failed uprising in Latakia province, according to officials and commanders interviewed by Reuters.
Anger boiled over again on Nov. 25, when thousands of Alawites protested in Homs and coastal cities demanding autonomy, the return of abducted women and the release of detainees. Reuters found no indication that Hassan or Makhlouf orchestrated the protests; instead, they were led by a cleric who opposes both men.
Fighters and ex-soldiers told Reuters they see no harm in taking money from both camps. “There is nothing wrong with taking some cash from these whales who sucked our blood for years,” one local commander said.
New government moves to contain the threat
The coastal governor of Tartous, Ahmed al-Shami, told Reuters that authorities are aware of the exiles’ plans and have made “dozens” of arrests linked to their networks. He confirmed the existence of the command rooms but described them as significantly weakened.
Russia and Lebanon have also privately signaled to Damascus a willingness to curtail any activity by Hassan or Makhlouf on their soil, according to Syrian officials. Diplomatic sources told Reuters that Moscow’s top priority is preserving access to its military bases in coastal Syria—not backing exiled Assad loyalists.
Makhlouf’s finances may also be tightening. Three people with knowledge of his operations said October salaries to fighters were delayed, suggesting cash flow problems amid international sanctions.
A counterweight rises
Countering the exiles is al-Ahmad, now the most influential Alawite aligned with the new government. Once a shadow diplomat and founding paramilitary commander for Assad, he fled the regime after falling out of favor and later helped Sharaa orchestrate Assad’s overthrow.
Four aides told Reuters that al-Ahmad is channeling funds into job-creation and development programs to stabilize the coast, where unemployment surged after Assad’s army was dissolved. Security forces have also arrested cells allegedly tied to Makhlouf, including one accused of plotting assassinations of journalists and activists.
In a statement to Reuters, al-Ahmad said “healing” and “uprooting sectarian hatred” remain central to stabilizing Syria.
The road ahead
While Hassan and Makhlouf seek to rally fighters around visions of restoration and vengeance, many of the people Reuters interviewed believe the prospect of a successful revolt remains slim. The two exiles are bitter rivals, their forces overlap, and they lack overt support from Russia. Many Alawites resent them for their role in past abuses.
A field commander overseeing several of the underground weapons sites summed up the prevailing uncertainty: the rooms remain stocked and ready, but for now, “there is no side worth choosing.”
