Editor’s Note: Excerpts of the following article are adapted from the author’s paper, originally published in CTC Sentinel, a publication of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.
Hamas has long maintained a reputation for focusing its violent activities within Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, yet historical evidence shows that the organization has periodically considered striking beyond these traditional theaters. While the group has never successfully carried out attacks outside its immediate region, intelligence and law enforcement investigations over the years reveal a persistent ambition to expand its reach internationally, constrained only by operational limitations and thwarted plots. In the years leading up to the October 7, 2023 attacks, a combination of tactical planning, opportunistic timing, and deteriorating operational capabilities in Gaza appears to have prompted Hamas to take a serious step toward realizing these external ambitions. Recent criminal cases in Germany and Denmark underscore that Hamas not only envisioned international operations but had established the infrastructure and personnel to carry them out, including pre-positioned weapons caches in multiple European countries and connections with organized crime groups capable of facilitating attacks abroad.
The October 7, 2023 attacks in Gaza marked a significant turning point for Hamas. In a meticulously planned assault, its specially trained Nukba forces, supported by rank-and-file members and allied militant factions, breached the Gaza-Israel border and launched coordinated attacks on civilian communities, military bases, and even a dance festival, resulting in roughly 1,200 civilian deaths and the abduction of 251 individuals into Gaza. The sheer scale of the attacks not only shocked Israel and the international community but also significantly degraded Hamas’ operational capabilities within Gaza. As the organization reassessed its strategic options in the aftermath, European and Israeli authorities began to warn of a growing likelihood that Hamas would seek to extend its operations globally, targeting Jewish and Israeli interests abroad. The logic behind this strategic pivot was clear: with its infrastructure in Gaza severely compromised, Hamas may view international operations as a means to retain leverage, exert pressure on Israel, and project influence at a time when the Palestinian cause was gaining heightened international attention.
The Israeli National Security Council issued updated warnings in advance of the Jewish High Holidays in 2025, highlighting the potential for terrorist attacks led predominantly by Hamas and Iran against Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. Citing dozens of thwarted attacks, the council underscored the unprecedented expansion of Hamas’ operational ambition, noting that the group had “expanded its own activities beyond the war in Gaza to establish terrorist infrastructure and carry out terrorist attacks against Jews and Israelis abroad.” Just days after this warning, German authorities arrested three suspected Hamas operatives on the eve of Yom Kippur for plotting attacks within Germany. These individuals had been tasked with procuring firearms and ammunition for targeted assassination attempts against Israeli or Jewish institutions, operating under direct instructions from Hamas leadership. The weapons had been traced to Scandinavia, where Hamas had previously established ties to organized crime networks. The suspects’ arrest highlighted not only the operational sophistication of these plots but also the direct involvement of senior Hamas leadership based in Lebanon, a sign of strategic intent rather than opportunistic or rogue activity.
The case of Ibrahim Elrassatmi, a German-based Hamas operative, illustrates the long-term planning behind these international operations. As early as 2019, Elrassatmi had traveled to Lebanon to receive instructions from the Qassam Brigades to establish weapons depots in Bulgaria, which he executed by burying firearms including handguns and a Kalashnikov rifle, photographing the location, and transmitting the information to his handlers. In subsequent years, he traveled to Denmark to retrieve weapons from pre-established caches, all under the supervision of senior Hamas figures, including Khalil al-Kharraz, then deputy commander of the Qassam Brigades in Lebanon. These early operations initially appeared to be contingency planning exercises, yet in 2023, as Hamas prepared for the October 7 attacks, these caches were revisited, suggesting a deliberate operational continuity aimed at enabling potential strikes in Europe if necessary.
Between June and December 2023, multiple operatives conducted repeated searches in Poland for weapons caches, maintaining regular contact with Hamas leadership in Lebanon. Even after the killing of al-Kharraz in an Israeli airstrike in November 2023, operatives continued their searches and reported back to surviving Hamas commanders, demonstrating both organizational resilience and the depth of leadership ties that extended across borders. German prosecutors emphasized that the individuals involved were not peripheral actors but key foreign operators directly supervised by senior Hamas figures. In addition to weapons caches, operatives had also identified potential targets in Germany, including the Israeli embassy in Berlin, the U.S. Ramstein air base, and Berlin’s Tempelhof airport. Similar plots were reported in Sweden, further emphasizing that Hamas’ planning had shifted from theoretical to actionable.
Denmark, too, witnessed the reach of Hamas’ evolving external operations. In December 2023, authorities arrested three individuals, including one Danish citizen affiliated with the organized crime group Loyal to Familia (LtF), for conspiring with Hamas to procure drones for attacks in Denmark and potentially Sweden. These plots demonstrated the group’s willingness to collaborate with European criminal networks to acquire weapons and technology for operational purposes. This cooperation with organized crime reflects a broader trend in Hamas’ external operations, mirroring the operational methods often associated with Iran’s Quds Force. Such collaboration not only facilitates access to arms but also provides cover for Hamas operatives living legally within European countries, highlighting the importance of long-term residency and mobility in executing external operations.
Historically, Hamas had occasionally threatened to carry out attacks abroad, but operational efforts had largely remained unrealized. Leaders like Fathi Hammad in 2019 called on Palestinian diaspora communities to target Jews worldwide, and as far back as 2003, Abdelaziz al-Rantisi promoted attacks against the United States. The 2003 arrest of Jamal Akal in Canada further revealed that Hamas operatives had received extensive training in small arms and explosives, planning to target Israeli officials and Jewish communities in North America. Despite these instances, Hamas generally refrained from actual operations abroad, focusing its military wing’s efforts on Gaza, the West Bank, and occasional rocket fire from Lebanon. The post-October 7 environment, however, appears to have catalyzed a shift, in part due to the strategic and symbolic impact of prior attacks, the weakened position in Gaza, and the operational networks established in Europe over several years.
The role of Hamas’ operational leadership in Lebanon has been central to this transition. Leaders like Salah al-Arouri, Khalil al-Kharraz, Azzam al-Aqra, and Samir Fandi created a command structure capable of directing attacks abroad. Al-Kharraz, in particular, coordinated weapons caches, oversaw operatives in Europe, and maintained ties to individuals such as Elrassatmi and Nazih Rustom. His death in November 2023 did not halt operations; surviving operatives continued to execute tasks, maintaining communication with Hamas leadership in Lebanon and demonstrating organizational continuity despite targeted Israeli strikes. This network also collaborated with Iran and Hezbollah through the so-called Unit 3900, providing additional logistics and operational capacity for potential attacks abroad. Coordination with Hezbollah and Iran underscores a growing regional dimension to Hamas’ external ambitions, highlighting the potential for more sophisticated and lethal operations facilitated by state and non-state actors with shared objectives.
Operational patterns suggest that Hamas has deliberately pursued a long-term strategy of embedding trusted operatives across Europe, often leveraging residency and citizenship status to ensure mobility and operational readiness. German and Dutch authorities identified operatives who had been granted residency permits as part of this strategy, sometimes using legitimate employment or charitable organizations as cover. Al-Israa, a Dutch charity designated by the U.S. as a Hamas front, exemplifies the use of ostensibly legitimate organizations to finance and support terrorist activities abroad. By combining operational networks, long-term residency, and partnerships with organized crime groups, Hamas has built a web of capabilities that extends beyond Gaza and the Levant, enabling the organization to act opportunistically or strategically in multiple European contexts.
Despite the clear evidence of planning and operational preparation, key questions about decision-making within Hamas remain unresolved. It is unclear whether the expansion of attacks abroad reflects a strategic shift across the organization or is the initiative of select leaders operating with autonomy due to the disruption of central command structures in Gaza. Israeli intelligence notes that with senior leaders killed or otherwise incapacitated, individual commanders in Lebanon or other operational hubs may act independently, seeking to assert influence, retaliate for losses, or maintain relevance within the broader Hamas hierarchy. The organization’s apparent willingness to collaborate with other actors, including Hezbollah, Iran, and European criminal networks, further complicates assessments, as it introduces additional layers of coordination, risk, and potential lethality.
Recent arrests and thwarted plots indicate that the threat posed by Hamas outside Gaza is real and ongoing. Investigations in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden highlight a pattern of proactive, deliberate planning, targeting Israeli and Jewish institutions, often timed symbolically to coincide with key anniversaries or religious holidays. Israeli authorities have publicly acknowledged the prevention of dozens of attacks, underscoring the severity of the threat and the level of vigilance required to counter it. The combination of historical ambition, operational networks established over years, partnerships with organized crime, and potential cooperation with state actors such as Iran and Hezbollah illustrates a multi-layered threat environment that European and Israeli authorities must contend with, suggesting that Hamas’ external operations may become a permanent, rather than exceptional, aspect of its operational doctrine.
Hamas’ efforts to expand globally represent a significant departure from its prior modus operandi. While its attacks in Gaza and Israel have historically been localized and focused on military and political targets, its new emphasis on external operations, particularly in Europe, signals a strategic recalibration. This shift is driven by a combination of diminished capabilities in Gaza, the symbolic impact of prior attacks, and the recognition that international operations may provide leverage in broader geopolitical negotiations. The organization’s investment in long-term planning, the use of foreign operators with legal European residency, and integration with criminal networks collectively indicate a sophisticated, proactive approach that could have far-reaching implications for European security and counterterrorism policy.
The evolution of Hamas’ operational posture illustrates a complex interplay between strategic ambition, operational necessity, and organizational adaptability. The October 7 attacks served as a catalyst, demonstrating the group’s willingness to undertake large-scale, coordinated operations, while recent arrests and investigations highlight the ongoing expansion of its capabilities abroad. European and Israeli authorities are now confronted with a threat environment in which Hamas’ external operations, facilitated by leadership in Lebanon, partnerships with criminal networks, and potential support from Iran and Hezbollah, are not merely aspirational but tangible. The challenge going forward will be to determine whether these external operations reflect a permanent shift in Hamas’ strategy or a temporary opportunistic response to the devastation in Gaza, and to adapt counterterrorism measures accordingly to prevent attacks on Israeli, Jewish, and allied targets around the world. The evidence to date, however, strongly suggests that Hamas has crossed a threshold, and the risk of international operations is now a central consideration in assessing the group’s future trajectory.
