In an unprecedented situation, ceasefire prospects have been further complicated, and the risks and regional anxiety of a complete collapse of the ceasefire or of the deal on the table have heightened. At first glance, it may appear to be a preventive escalatory action by Iran to deter Israel from a barrage of strikes on Lebanon and targeting Hezbollah. However, deeper introspection reveals that this may be a strategic move to capitalise on the opportunity to impose indirect kinetic pressure on Iran, thereby further coercing it to take negotiations more seriously and develop an exit plan.
The Iranians have been witnessing extreme pressure on their most crucial proxy network, Hezbollah. Despite ceasefire guarantees from the US, Israel continued the bombardment, causing havoc in Lebanon and even reaching a situation where boots on the ground in southern Lebanon were on the cards. But as Israel began bombing Hezbollah’s strongholds in the Dahieh suburb of Beirut, and the ceasefire appeared to be just a piece of paper, Iran shifted from seeking a ceasefire to direct preventive kinetic action against Israel, as it cannot afford to see its strongest regional proxy within its Axis of Resistance severely weakened or lose its strongholds. Iran’s abandonment of restraint has opened the gates for the resumption of the conflict that began in February and was de-escalated in April. A closer examination of the current situation suggests that a twin opportunity is indirectly staring both the US and Israel in the face, and it is not the first time that dual-escalation control through strength has been used to coerce and build kinetic pressure.
Israel may be executing a calibrated tripwire strategy to steer negotiating dynamics, especially the ceasefire deal between Iran and the US. Israel is stepping up strikes on Hezbollah, knowing that placing immense kinetic pressure on Iran, despite paper assurances, will test Iranian patience and potentially lead Iran to step on the tripwire. As a result, Iran launched direct strikes on Israel, giving Israel strategic room for two actions. First, Israel takes an active role in ceasefire negotiations. Until now, Israel feared that the US might announce a deal in a hurry, conceding to some of Iran’s demands, thus giving Iran regional strength in the long run and also resulting in a humiliating and strategic loss for Israel at a sensitive juncture, with Benjamin Netanyahu standing on the brink of elections and facing immense domestic pressure. Second, it would allow the US to maintain indirect kinetic pressure on Iran, which until now was directly carried out by the US through surgical strikes. In the past, this tripwire strategy was in active focus during the Israel-Iran conflict, even decades ago, when Iran instigated Israel to ensure regional pressure, the isolation of Israel, and to threaten US credibility in the region. Last year’s strikes on Qatar by Israel are a key example that served Iran’s dual purpose. In 2014, during Israel’s decision to launch an offensive operation in Gaza codenamed Protective Edge, the trigger was the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank, which led to a 50-day conflict with significant civilian casualties and a failure to achieve strategic objectives. On the contrary, it helped Palestinians and radical groups to unite and strengthen themselves. This now represents a strategic reversal of the tripwire strategy by Israel against Iran. While Israel has taken a risky escalatory route through a tripwire strategy, this presents a two-way situation.
The Trump-Netanyahu relationship is hitting bumps in this escalation game with Iran. On the one hand, Trump openly criticises Netanyahu and pushes for a ceasefire in Lebanon; on the other hand, Netanyahu is not seriously paying heed to Trump’s request. Israel has not minced words in labelling these strikes as preventive or self-defence actions and has assured that it will continue. Most notable was the US intelligence community raising the counterintelligence threat level, suspecting that Israel’s intelligence agency is spying on the US and mounting clandestine operations to gather intelligence on US-Iran deal progress. This has created a trust deficit at the operational level, giving a glimpse of the US losing its grip over Israel. In recent statements, Trump categorically said, “I call the shots and he doesn’t.” He further, according to reports, had planned to call Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to tell him not to respond to the first barrage of Iranian missiles. The Financial Times reported that the president said Mr Netanyahu had no choice but to accept a deal with Iran.
All these developments clearly point out that Israel’s tripwire strategy against Iran became a strategic necessity for Israel to ensure it does not get a bad deal where Iran gains, or Israel is pushed into isolation, where the US and Iran strike a hurried deal out of desperation for an exit. But for the US, a shift in the strategic picture suggests it may be a deliberately staged indirect coercion through strong kinetic pressure. The US may have given a private or implicit green light to Israel to continue or intensify bombings on Hezbollah strongholds while criticising at the diplomatic level to raise the pressure on Iran indirectly and push regional actors to bring Iran to the negotiating table. A tripwire strategy purposely set by the US-Israel axis could be used to instigate Iran into taking unilateral action that can be internationally framed as provocation. If so, this would not be the first time the US has provided tacit support for broader strategic objectives.
The Reagan administration publicly opposed any Israeli invasion of Lebanon, whether diplomatically or openly. However, privately, when former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited Washington, D.C., and met US Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the situation was different. The meeting suggested divergent US intentions, as Haig indicated that the US would not actively oppose a limited Israeli invasion but imposed a strict condition. He told Sharon that US support or tolerance for Israeli actions depended on an “internationally recognised provocation”, essentially a tripwire event that would justify the invasion to the global community. Many analysts, citing declassified records, referred to this as a tacit green light for the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Israel got its tripwire moment on 3 June 1982, when the Abu Nidal Organization—a rogue militant group that was actually a bitter enemy of the PLO—attempted to assassinate Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador to the UK, in London. Even the PLO was not responsible for this attack. Israel launched heavy airstrikes on PLO targets in Beirut, and when the PLO retaliated with heavy shelling, Israel escalated drastically by launching a full invasion of Lebanon. In this case as well, the US strategic objective was within reach: Israel’s invasion of Lebanon weakened Syrian and Soviet influence in Lebanon and reduced their regional leverage in the Middle East.
Similarly, a comparable dynamic may now be playing out privately between Trump and Netanyahu, even as it is publicly criticised by the US in pursuit of an immediate ceasefire. Although Iran and Israel have paused strikes, the underlying strategic intent reflects a two-front coercion of Iran, both at kinetic and non-kinetic levels. However, a larger question remains: whether disguised kinetic pressure can achieve the full deterrent effect needed to successfully coerce Iran, or whether it instead risks further escalation and another failed strategic gamble.
