The U.S.-Iran war has reached its six-month mark without a settlement, despite intensified mediation by Pakistan, Qatar and Oman and continuing efforts to revive the collapsed but still viable June peace outline, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
According to an assessment by The Soufan Center, the latest exchanges underline the central problem confronting both sides: neither Washington nor Tehran appears willing to accept a settlement on terms it considers unfavourable. Over the weekend, U.S. forces struck Iranian missile launchers on Larak Island, which Washington assessed were preparing to launch rockets with sea mines into the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responded by striking Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, which hosts a significant U.S. military presence.
The strikes have cast fresh doubt over the mediation process. Although both sides continue to express interest in a resolution, the possibility of a return to major combat remains. Mediators have assessed that President Trump is eager to end a conflict that has depleted the U.S. munitions arsenal, harmed the global economy and diminished his domestic support in advance of November mid-term elections. Regional leaders also believe that the erosion of Iran’s control over traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and severe economic conditions inside Iran have increased support within the regime for ending the war.
Yet neither development has produced capitulation.
President Trump said last week that he did not anticipate, but also did not rule out, ordering additional kinetic strikes. Instead, the administration has promoted Operation Economic Outcast, announced last week as an effort to intensify economic pressure on Iran and weaken its bargaining position. Iranian forces, meanwhile, continue attacking ships transiting the Strait while regime leaders threaten further military escalation in an attempt to restore Iranian control over the waterway and compel Trump to end the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports.
The Soufan Center’s assessment points to strategic assumptions on both sides that have proved difficult to abandon. Trump had overruled assessments by the U.S. intelligence community in believing that a U.S.-Israeli “decapitation” strike that killed Iran’s Supreme Leader in the opening air strikes would collapse the Iranian regime. The administration has continued to believe that economic pressure could produce regime collapse, despite the regime remaining cohesive, in charge and capable of implementing a counter-strategy developed over decades. No popular uprising against the regime has materialised to date.
Washington also assessed that overwhelming air power would, at the very least, compel Tehran to accept U.S. demands for a settlement. The Trump team continues to argue that crippling economic sanctions and the naval blockade will eventually force Iranian leaders to capitulate, including accepting maximum U.S. demands to completely dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme.
Iran, however, has not altered its core positions. The Soufan Center notes that this is consistent with U.S. intelligence estimates that the Iranian regime can transfer almost all the economic pain to a population that can be controlled by the country’s large security apparatus. Even if the two sides return to the MOU, the agreement postpones the central U.S. objective of severely restricting Iran’s nuclear programme to further negotiations. There are no indications that Tehran will agree to dismantle the programme outright.
Iran entered the war with a strategy developed over decades to withstand a U.S. or Israeli assault. Tehran relied on ballistic and cruise missiles and attack drones to close the Strait of Hormuz, undermine the security of the Gulf states, disrupt global economic and energy markets and ultimately force Washington to terminate the campaign.
The regime had also anticipated a possible U.S. or Israeli decapitation strike. It therefore established several layers of military and political succession for every post and delegated authority to local military units to undertake kinetic action as they considered appropriate. The approach is known as Iran’s “mosaic defense strategy”.
But the strategy has not produced the outcome Tehran anticipated. IRGC expectations that it could drive oil prices to $200 per barrel or more and indefinitely prevent the U.S. Navy from restoring commercial traffic through the Strait have not been realised. Oil prices exceeded $120 per barrel in April but subsequently fell, although they remain well above pre-war levels.
Iranian attacks have caused widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure and bases hosting U.S. forces. They have nevertheless failed to persuade the Trump administration to abandon its campaign, prevented U.S. operations over Iran and its waters, or compelled Washington to accept Tehran’s maximum demands.
The consequences extend beyond the battlefield. For the Arab Gulf states, the war has raised fundamental questions about dependence on the U.S. security umbrella. The Gulf states are unlikely to downgrade their security partnership with Washington, frustrating Iran’s efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and its Gulf partners. At the same time, Gulf governments are expected to continue diversifying their strategic relationships, illustrated by the August “Mecca Agreement” between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye.
The Gulf states are also reassessing the security value of hosting large foreign military deployments. Most Arab Gulf rulers are expected to engage with Iran to avoid further retaliation, while remaining concerned that Tehran could attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz if its red lines are crossed.
Even if the war ends soon, the Gulf states are expected to accelerate projects designed to export energy through pipelines bypassing the Strait. Not all projects under consideration may be completed, but the developments are expected to reduce Iran’s long-term strategic leverage over the waterway.
The war has also shaken confidence within the U.S. strategy community. Reports that the Department of War is considering whether to rebuild Gulf bases damaged by Iranian missiles and drones have raised broader questions about America’s military posture.
The likely direction, according to The Soufan Center, is a return to an “over-the-horizon” U.S. presence rather than the forward positioning of forces in major Gulf bases that followed the 1991 Iraq war. The damage inflicted on those bases, despite their remaining operational, has also highlighted concerns over the cost and availability of U.S. missile and drone defences compared with the relatively small amounts Iran spends producing large quantities of attack munitions.
The implications are global. Russia and China view the war as a significant U.S. failure, according to the assessment, potentially weakening perceptions of American deterrence. In late August, CIA Director John Ratcliffe made a rare official visit to Moscow following reported U.S. intelligence findings that Russia might be preparing to exploit observed U.S. weaknesses to attack NATO countries in northern Europe.
For Iran, the war has produced a similarly complicated result. Tehran has achieved strategic successes, but has failed to reorder the regional balance of power. More significantly, the conflict has called into question its decades-old “forward defense strategy”.
Before the war, and particularly before the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, Iran had relied on its regional allies — its “Axis of Resistance” — to deter U.S. or Israeli attacks against the Iranian mainland. The deterrent value of that network was exposed as flawed by the June 2025 U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear and missile facilities.
The Axis has also failed to become the decisive “force multiplier” Tehran needed during the 2026 war. Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah had already been weakened by Israeli offensives following the October 7 attack and were poorly positioned to provide decisive assistance to Iran by forcing U.S. and Israeli forces, munitions, and missile and drone defences to fight on multiple fronts.
Iran-aligned militias have carried out effective attacks, particularly against energy facilities in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but U.S. counterstrikes against their headquarters have limited their impact. Iraqi militants now confront a Baghdad government determined to restrict their ability to draw Iraq into a regional war on behalf of Tehran.
The Houthi movement in Yemen only began actively supporting Iran five months into the war, after the point at which its involvement could decisively change the balance of power. Its efforts to obstruct the Bab el-Mandeb Strait were also driven by its pre-war objective of breaking the Saudi blockade of Houthi-controlled ports and territory. Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping since last month have not materially affected global energy prices.
Perhaps most significantly for Tehran, the war has not divided Israel from either Washington or the Arab world as Iranian leaders had anticipated. Trump has sidelined Israel from wartime decision-making since the first month of the conflict but continues broad cooperation with Israel on regional issues.
The UAE and Bahrain, which normalised relations with Israel under the Trump-brokered 2020 “Abraham Accords”, have suffered significant Iranian attacks. Neither has downgraded relations with Israel or abandoned the accords. Instead, the UAE has expanded its defence relationship with Israel to help counter Iranian missile and drone strikes.
In another setback for Iranian regional influence, Israel and Lebanon are now working together on a plan to disarm Hezbollah, Iran’s key regional ally, and potentially eliminate Iranian influence from Lebanon.
Six months into the war, neither Washington nor Tehran has achieved the decisive outcome it anticipated. The United States has been unable to compel Iran to accept its central demands despite overwhelming military and economic pressure. Iran, meanwhile, has demonstrated its capacity to inflict serious costs on U.S. partners, disrupt energy infrastructure and threaten the Strait of Hormuz — but has failed to force Washington to end the campaign.
The result is an unresolved conflict in which both sides have demonstrated significant capabilities while exposing the limits of their respective strategies. The immediate question remains whether mediation can bridge those gaps before the latest strikes trigger a return to major combat. The longer-term question may be even more consequential: whether the war has permanently altered the military and political assumptions that shaped the Middle East for decades.
