Pakistan’s four-province structure has not evolved since independence. The rationale behind administrative units is to deliver fair and timely services and to ensure political participation by every citizen. The huge population, according to the 2023 national census, of 241.5 million, however, has undermined this motive, especially in Punjab, which has a population of 127.7 million. There are 40.86 million people in KP, 55.70 million in Sindh, and 14.9 million in Balochistan. This inappropriate distribution of population has restricted political access and concentrated power in the hands of narrow elites. It is now imperative to revisit the provincial landscape, as it is not feasible to manage and govern large populations from a single provincial capital, such as Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi, or Quetta.
It has been widely observed that certain political parties are resisting the proposal to create new provinces. Still, their concerns are not genuine but are rooted in patronage networks of identity politics, elite capture, and the protection of the political monopoly. The existing provincial capitals are less effective due to heavy workloads and their distance from the peripheries. South Punjab is less developed than central Punjab, and the resolution is stalled under Article 239(4), which requires a two-thirds majority to create a province. The same goes for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Hazara region, Quetta’s Makran region, and in Sindh, where the speed of development is not up to the mark.
The Architecture of Elite Capture
In Pakistan, political power is concentrated in the hands of two political parties: one based in Sindh and the other based in Punjab from the 1980s onward. Both of these parties have seen successive generations move into top offices while senior members remain active, keeping leadership succession largely within the same households, thereby undermining democratic standards. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) data show that from 2002 to 2013, at least 50 percent of lawmakers were elected from established political families. The core agenda of these two political parties is to remain in the ruling circle, whether by forming a coalition, alternating between rivalry and cooperation, or leaving no space for outsiders.
Dubai unlocked, and OCCRP data revealed that Pakistanis own homes in Dubai worth $11 billion, with London holding $740 million. These assets belong to political elites and former high-ranking officeholders. In addition, the UNDP has assessed elite privileges in Pakistan at $ 17.4 billion, which makes up 6 to 8 percent of the GDP. Moreover, the land reforms from colonial times remain pending and have not distributed resources to lower levels, and 1.1 percent of Pakistan’s population holds 22 percent of the total land, which emphasizes agrarian concentration and anchors rural patronage in South Punjab and Sindh. Interestingly, land is not inherited but has been granted on loyalty bases from the British viceroy. The tax concessions, power sector capacity payments, and state-owned enterprises have raised the loss figure to $832.8 billion for fiscal year 2024–2025.
Socio-Economic Distress and the Youth Paradox
The grievances correlate with deteriorating outcomes for ordinary citizens. For instance, between 2015 and 2025, national poverty rose from 24.3 percent to 28.9 percent. This further indicates extreme regional inequalities: Balochistan is at the top of the list with 47 percent, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with 35.3 percent, Sindh with 32.6 percent, and Punjab with 23.3 percent.
The youth bulge is both an opportunity and a threat, especially when unemployment surges to 7.1 percent. Moreover, food insecurity is affecting 24 percent of households alongside a 33.6 percent stunting rate among children under five years. Around 760,000 people have left the country in 2025 to work abroad, which is indeed a dilemma. Youth aged 18 to 35 make up about 44 percent of registered voters. At the same time, figures from the Inter-Parliamentary Union show that lawmakers aged under 30 are just 2.3 percent, and those aged 40 or under are 12.2 percent after the 2024 election, indicating a constraining of merit-based entry for talented people.
Administrative Constraints on Local Government
Creating new provinces is frequently associated with an additional financial burden on the taxpayer, including additional provincial assemblies, secretariats, and departments. However, these concerns are pragmatic, but here it is important to weigh them against the cost of maintaining an over-centralized system that has struggled to deliver equitable development. Provincial governments allocate 80 percent of their budgets to expenditures, leaving limited fiscal space for development. The 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award allocates 57.5 percent of the divisible pool to provinces, distributing 51.74 percent to Punjab, 24.55 percent to Sindh, 14.62 percent to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 9.09 percent to Balochistan.
Although these provincial shares are estimated at around Rs 8.85 trillion for fiscal 2026–27, many peripheral areas still lack access to public services, including employment opportunities and development funds. The key question here is whether governance problems are related more to resource scarcity or to the distribution and management of existing resources.
When viewed in administrative terms of effectiveness and electoral representation rather than in identity terms, the case for new provinces becomes more convincing. Both South Punjab and Hazara have repeatedly demanded greater administrative autonomy, as decisions are still made in provincial capitals. The resolution is also presented, but no constitutional progress has been made so far, with only 18 general seats out of 145 in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly.
In addition, local governments, which Article 140A of the constitution requires provinces to empower, have experienced a sharp decline in fiscal support. Consolidated public spending by local governments has fallen below 5 percent, down from 10 percent since 2005. In Sindh, transfers of funds to local councils have declined from 15.7 percent to 5.8 percent; in Punjab, from 30 percent to 22 percent; while in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a decline from 30 percent to 22 percent in the allocation of funds has been recorded.
These trends demand policy attention and devolution, whether via new provinces or stronger local governments with a core focus on improving accountability and reducing administrative distance.
Growing Public Demand for Administrative Reorganization
The question of new administrative units is now on the national political agenda. In September 2026, Suno Radio surveyed 4,000 people, and 75.52% supported creating new provinces. 92 News polled 250,906 people, and 72.8% were in favor. Numerous online media polls have been conducted using varying methodologies and sample sizes, but most have favored establishing new provinces.
Conclusion
The state runs on a continuous inflow of information, and for better governance, the distance between the state and the citizen needs to be reduced. Earlier, Pakistan’s four-province structure was sufficient for a smaller population and a less complex administrative environment. Today, population growth, hyperurbanization, and increasing governance demands in modern societies have placed immense pressure on provincial capitals, which must handle vast inflows of information, meet growing service needs, and respond to diverse territorial concerns. Threats and challenges in the asymmetric domain: Human and institutional limitations make it extremely challenging for centralized provincial administrations to govern effectively.
In the 21st century, with the changing landscape of human societies, it is important to pair any reforms with digitalization and a transparent data system, and to empower local institutions. Change is continuity, and evolution is the true aspect of human society. Therefore, a national consensus would be instrumental in achieving collective gains and overcoming political parties’ resistance rooted in vote-bank politics, identity-based concerns, and inclusive representation with constitutional protection is the only viable option. Furthermore, these principles can shape and should guide the future evolution of Pakistan’s governance structure.
