Dharman Wickremaratne’s latest book ‘Premakeerthi Ghathanaye Sulamula’ meticulously examines the killing of radio announcer, producer and lyricist Premakeerthi de Alwis in late July 1989, at the height of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led terror campaign.
Having examined various claims, accusations and assertions by interested parties, including Premakeerthi’s first wife, Daya, the author on the basis of the proceedings at the Colombo High Court, during the UNP rule, declared that the much admired SLBC staffer was killed by the JVP.
A gang of JVPers gunned down Premakeerthi after having taken him out of his home, situated on the Homagama-Katuwana road.
Premakeerthi had been 10 years younger to SLBC announcer and lyricist Daya at the time of their marriage. Mother of one child, Daya had been the widow of journalist Somapala Ranatunga at the time she met Premakeerthi.
Daya, who legally separated from Premakeerthi in 1975, following a five-year tumultuous marriage, sent shockwaves through political parties when she declared her former husband was assassinated at the behest of Hudson Samarasinghe. The shocking but unsubstantiated declaration was made at an event at the SLBC, chaired by President Rajapaksa, to mark the 25th death anniversary of Premakeerthi. This happened on 31 July, 2014, just six months before the change of government.
Hudson Samarasinghe moved court against Daya but she again cleared the JVP of one of the most dastardly killings at that time when she appeared alongside National People’s Power candidate Anura Kumara Dissanayake at a propaganda event at the Colombo Public Library about six years later. She cleared the JVP of Premakeerthi’s killing. AKD, who simultaneously led both the JVP and NPP, had been unsuccessful at the 2019 Nov. presidential election. The event at the Colombo public library was held in late Oct. 2019. Daya’s declaration didn’t make any impact.
Hudson Samarasinghe withdrew his defamation case seeking compensation to the tune of Rs 500 mn in the wake of Daya’s death in late July this year.
Dharman, the former Divaina staffer, who served as the Editor of Silumina for a period of four years, during the administrations of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremesinghe (2020-2024,) has so far authored four books on the ’80s terror and he intends to release five more books on that period.
Wickremaratne’s far reaching work on the JVP should be examined cautiously, keeping in mind that the author himself had been accused of being supportive of the JVP, and Upali Newspapers was compelled to discontinue his services as a Divaina staffer. The writer joined The Island in 1987, four years after Wickremaretne joined Divaina.
Both the UNP and the JVP furiously directed attacks on the media with the state media at the receiving end of unbridled violence as the latter sought to overwhelm the government. Wickremaretne skillfully dealt with the violence against the media at a time the South bled. In the Northern and Eastern provinces, the armed forces had been confined to barracks in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, while the New Delhi’s Army, deployed here as the Indian Peace Keeping Force, battled the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) till they were asked to leave by President Premadasa while supplying truckloads of weapons and money to the Tigers to fight the IPKF.
‘Premakeerthi Ghathanaye Sulamula’ is a must read for those interested in the JVP rise to power after having launched two abortive bids in 1971 and 1987-1989 to capture power. Wickremaretne’s account of Saman Priyankara, who had been sentenced to life in prison in March 1994 during the tail end of the UNP reign, joining the JVP, is exciting. The teenager had been among a gang of activists assigned to kill Premakeerthi for refusing to heed a JVP directive to quit the SLBC. The Prisons Department released him after serving 18 years out of the life term.
The author, who had been digging into the past, met Saman Priyankara, as well as many other former members of the organisation. Wickremaratne’s work is particularly important against the backdrop of the JVP-led NPP enjoying political power. Having secured the presidency at the 2019 Sept presidential poll, the AKD-led NPP won an overwhelming 159 seats – nine more than an extraordinary 2/3 majority.
Inspired by anti-India feelings
The author explained the circumstances Saman Priyankara had been sentenced to life imprisonment though he was not among those who shot Premakeerthi. Those who allegedly shot Premakeerthi hadn’t been identified/apprehended during counter-insurgency operations. Saman Priyankara had been a member of the JVP hit squad though he didn’t cause any physical harm to Premakeerthi.
During court proceedings, it transpired that a gang of JVPers, numbering about six, confronted them (Saman Priyankara and a person identified as Pathmasiri), in July 1989, on the road, close to Magammana Purana Viharaya, and demanded that they join the JVP as the Indian Army was destroying Sri Lanka.
The JVP blatantly exploited the deployment of the Indian Army, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, in terms of the Indo-Lanka accord that had been forced on Sri Lanka, to muster public support. That is the undeniable truth. The author also very briefly discussed the operations undertaken by the JVP in the eastern Trincomalee district embroiled in post-accord violence that at one point threatened to undermine the whole ‘peace’ process.
While the author placed the number of Indian military deaths at 29 during this period (1987 July to 1990 March), the JVP claimed its Eastern front group killed 63 Indians. India never acknowledged deaths caused by JVPers cadres. The JVP’s claims, as well as Wickremaratne’s assertions with regard to Indian Army deaths, need further verification.
As Wickremaratne pointed, out it would be pertinent to mention that the JVP launched its terror campaign several months before India forced Sri Lanka to accept the deployment of its Army here. The first victim of JVP terror had been 39-year-old H. Jayawickrema, killed on 05 Dec., 1986. The JVP found fault with Jayawickrema, principal of Gonadeniya Vidyalaya, Middeniya, for suspending a group of students over pasting of JVP notices.
The Middeniya killing was followed with the assassination of Daya Pathirana on 15 Dec., 1986. At the time of his death, Pathirana led the Independent Students Union of University of Colombo during the period 1985–1986. However, the deployment of the Indian Army gave a massive boost to the JVP and the supposed Marxist group shook the entire political establishment by mounting grenade attacks on the UNP parliamentary group in Parliament on 18 August, 1987. Both President JRJ and Premier Ranasinghe Premadasa had been present at the time of the attack. That attack compelled both the government and the JVP to go all out against each other.
But what really made me interested is the fact that the JVP involved Saman Priyankara, an Army deserter’s younger brother, in somewhat of a high profile killing within days, if not weeks, after he joined the organisation. Obviously the JVP disregarded the possibility of a novice ending up in police/security forces custody. Perhaps, in the absence of sufficient experienced armed cadre, the organisation absorbed the young novices into units assigned to eliminate opponents. Like the Tigers, the cunning JVP hierarchy attracted youth to their movement in their impressionable young and gullible years.
Saman Priyankara had been just 17 years at the time he pledged his allegiance to the organisation. Wickremaretne disclosed some interesting information pertaining to the use of children by the LTTE. According to him, 171 children, under 15 years of age, had been apprehended and rehabilitated after the annihilation of the JVP. But as a percentage of 11,658 rehabilitated, those under 15 is just 1%. However, of the 15 to 25 age category, which included Saman Priyankara, 5,508 underwent rehabilitation (46%) of the total rehabilitated.
The JVP’s use of children cannot be compared with that of the LTTE during the war in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The LTTE threw children into high intensity battles, involving armour and artillery, and, in a despicable manner that caused massive loss of life. But that does not absolve the JVP of culpability in using children in terrorist activity as cannon fodder.
The author revealed how a 13-year-old boy received training off Kantale in mid-1989. The boy is alleged to have killed a female UNP supporter. As the JVP collapsed in early 1990, within months after the arrest and execution of its leader, Rohana Wijeweera, the boy, known as ‘bonikka’ (doll) must have carried out the killing at the age of 13 or 14.
One of the gruesome examples given by the author to highlight the use of children is the killing of an SLTB driver, identified as Dingiri Banda, who defied a JVP directive not to work. Two 15-year-old boys, in Grade 09, according to the author, murdered the driver attached to the Kuliyapitiya bus depot, at Giriulla. The killing of an employee of the Udugama Janatha Estate Development Board was also blamed on a child activist who delivered the severed head of the victim on a plate to his home. The possibility of exaggeration cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the JVP, now ensconced in power, should consider inquiring into such allegations.
The involvement of children in two other incidents was also mentioned by Wickremaretne whose exposure surely embarrassed not only the JVP but the NPP as well. A driver, attached to the Kataragama depot, identified as Weerasekera, had been killed just before he stepped onto the traditional Poruwa with his would-be-bride for their marriage ceremony at Pallemalala, Hambantota.
Inquirer into sudden deaths of the Hali-Ela Dehiwini Palatha korale, Weeraratne had been shot dead at his home. The author confidently asserted that though children lacked political ideology they were a new element ready to act swiftly. But on the other hand, when apprehended they quickly succumbed to police and armed forces pressure and ended up being informants.
During that reign of terror, altogether 137 SLTB employees had been murdered by the JVP for refusing to leave employment.
JVP’s swift collapse
By June/July 1989, the government had been desperately trying to cope up with the situation. Amidst JVP attacks, and counter violence unleashed by the police, the armed forces and paramilitary groups, the UNP won the parliamentary elections conducted in February 1989. The JVP ordered a civil disobedience campaign. The JVP issued specific orders against those who disregarded its campaign meant to destabilise the state-run media. The then State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne on 07 July, 1989, vowed to retaliate. The author pointed out the JVP’s response to Wijeratne’s warning by killing four persons attached to state media, namely Thevis Guruge (23 July, 1989), Premakeerthi de Alwis (31 July, 1989), chief news editor of Rupavahini, Kulasiri Amaratunga (13 August, 1989) and Rupavahini announcer Sagarika Gomes (13 Sept., 1989). The situation was so bad, President Ranasinghe Premadasa had no option but to bring state media under the then Air Commodore Ananda Samarakoon.
In fact, Premakeerthi had been among a group of SLBC staffers who received letters on a Friday morning, in the first week of July, threatening them with death. All of the threatened persons had been attached to the News Section of the SLBC. The threatened were Hemasiri Kularatne, Wasantha Lankathilaka, Palitha Perera and Premakeerthi de Alwis. However, Premakeerthi had been quite confident that the JVP, or the so-called Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV), wouldn’t cause him any harm. Obviously he was totally wrong.
In a way, the country had been in the grip of JVP terror with the government making desperate bids to counter such violence. Amidst many employees refusing to serve as announcers, due to direct death threats on them, the government brought in the Army and Air Force personnel to fill the vacuum.
Wickremaratne appreciated the role played by military personnel as announcers. The author recalled how Airwoman Anoma Satharasingha, on the night of 13 Nov., 1989, announced the arrest and death of JVP leader Wijeweera. The author named those who had served the government at the risk to their lives amidst the killing of their colleagues. However, Wickremaretne failed to explain as to why Premakeerthi, in spite of receiving direct and specific death threats, hadn’t been granted military security. There is no explanation as to why Premakeerthi had been deprived of security. Did he decline to accept military security?
While trying to cripple the state-run media, the JVP tried hard to set up its own radio. It was called Ranahanda. The government quickly identified the JVP strategy and took measures to neutralize that threat.
Wickremaretne’s narrative of the Army putting pressure on Director Programmes, Rupavahini, Piyadasa Rathnasinha, to announce Wijeweera’s killing, around 2 am, made good reading. The author based his description on an interview Irida Lankadeepa writer Priyantha Kodipilli had with Piyadasa Rathnasinha, carried in the 12 January, 2024, edition. Piyadasa Rathnasinha’s claim that he declined to adhere with the instructions issued by the Army and got in touch with President Premadasa, around 2 am in the morning, and received order from the head-of-state not to telecast the video but wait till he viewed the tape and decided what to do, underscored the crisis at the time. President Premadasa had visited Rupavahini on the same day, viewed the video and decided to edit Wijeweera’s speech, recorded by the Army, to just two minutes.
After having won the presidential election, conducted in Dec. 1988, President Ranasinghe Premadasa made a desperate bid to reach a consensus with the JVP. Regardless of serious concerns, expressed by the police, the armed forces and members of the government, President Premadasa ordered the release of a large number of detained JVP suspects from various places. The President’s gamble failed. The JVP intensified violence. The government resorted to an all-out campaign. The country bled. Within a couple of months after Premadasa’s election as President, the government gradually overwhelmed the JVP. The latter couldn’t keep up with the pace of the government counter terror campaign. Within four months after Premakeerthi’s assassination, the JVP was in tatters. Its top leadership was executed, barring Somawanasa Amerasinghe, who managed to escape to India with the help of New Delhi, and thousands of activists and supporters killed.
Those who demand legal action against Ranil Wickremesinghe for his association with the Batalanda conveniently forget how the JVP strategy compelled the then government to resort to counter terror tactics. But the JVP may not have contemplated the scale of the government’s counter attack. The UNP, regardless of consequences, also took measures to suppress the Opposition, including the media. The assassination of much loved journalist Richard de Zoysa was obviously part of that counter-insurgency strategy. It certainly was a case of absolute power corrupting absolutely with R. Premadasa and Ranjan Wijeratne, who wanted to consolidate their power at any cost. Similarly, the JVPers are no angels or they were even worse having sent so many innocent people to premature and gruesome deaths for their macabre wishes to succeed with no permanent principles whatsoever. A good example of this is that after the crushing of their second violent uprising they joined every government that came to power, thereafter, as a coalition partner and every time it helped to topple each of those administrations in its cunning march to power.
