This series is based on the Sri Lankan civil war, exploring the experiences of a naval officer who played a crucial role in operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Through his firsthand accounts, it reveals the complexities of military strategy, personal sacrifice, and the enduring quest for peace in a nation divided by conflict. – Editors
There were four political, economic and administrative reasons which could be cited as the main causes for the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. They are the promulgation of 1956 Sinhala-Only Act, the Republican Constitution of 1972, the Parliamentary elections of 1977 and the 1983 “black July” ethnic riots. However, the killing of 13 Sri Lankan Army (SLA) soldiers by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on 23 July 1983 marked the initiation of armed hostilities by the insurgents and the beginning of Eelam War I, which ended in 1987.
Thereafter, the Indian intervention with the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) from October 1987 to March 1990 ended in an utter failure. Eelam War II began in July 1990 and ended in a ceasefire in January 1995. The next episode of fighting (Eelam War III) commenced in April 1995, and culminated in the February 2002 ceasefire, the longest in the conflict. It was officially abolished by the Sri Lankan Government (SLG) particularly in January 2008, but due to the unsteady ceasefire hostilities resumed from 2006-2008.
Later, the flat out Eelam War IV commenced in July 2006 and developed up into full scale offensive. The security forces accomplished a significant victory on 18 May 2009, when the Tigers were encircled near their stronghold of Mullaithivu. However, the main attempt of previous government strategies was to bring the rebels to the negotiating table. Ceasefires were accompanied by five direct and two back- channel negotiations with the insurgents. The first of five attempts was the failed Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which was followed by efforts towards power-sharing, made by two presidents, one Prime Minister and finally, President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The insurgents were offered the best chances for devolution by PM Wickeremesinghe, when both sides agreed to explore a federal solution in December 2002, but the Tigers reneged on this proposal. Rajapaksa expected peace from two rounds of talks at Geneva and Oslo in 2005-06 but finally became convinced that the insurgents, under its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, would never agree to a negotiated settlement; as he believed in achieving a separate state through only military means.
The paper analyzes the importance of the civil war in Sri Lanka giving reasons for the success and mistakes of the opposing group and highlights the importance of defeating maritime capability. In the final analysis, it concludes that the Clausewitz trinity has some relevance and the lessons learned could be applied elsewhere in the world with caution.
Why the Sri Lankan conflict is important
In the months of May 2009, the Sri Lankan government forces completely destroyed the Tamil Tigers, who had fought an insurgency for thirty years. The decisive military victory brought lasting peace to the island. According to British writer Professor Paul Moorcraft, who has researched extensively on Sri Lanka’s conflict, it was the first time since the end of the Second World War that a large-scale indigenous insurgency had been defeated by military force. In other situations usually, both government forces and insurgents have negotiated for a settlement other than war.1
Sri Lankan Insurgency and Irish Republican Army
As an example, Professor Paul Moorcraft in his groundbreaking book “Total Destruction of Tamil Tigers” draws a parallel between Sri Lanka and Ireland as a reference to understand the uniqueness of the victory in an academic sense, despite the different context. Sri Lanka and Ireland both are islands of roughly the same size. The Sri Lankan government’s victory was as if the British Army had killed thousands of Irish Republican Army members in a mere few months to end completely the conflict in Northern Ireland. Instead, years of complex negotiations, aided (or impeded) by international diplomacy from the Republic of Ireland and the US, and a willingness by the Provisional IRA to negotiate a settlement created an eventual political deal. The Northern Ireland conflict was modern Europe’s longest insurgency and its plotters on, even though just a few dozen active hardliners still see violence as an option.
In contrast, the Sri Lanka insurgents wanted to create ‘Tamil Eelam’, an independent state on the island. Since their final defeat, Sri Lanka has not had to suffer any significant post- conflict insurgent violence (or ‘terrorism’) – no bombings to disrupt civilian life at all; zero incident so far. This is remarkable but unusual. If the peace is truly permanent, the conflict may well teach other nations how to end wars, give the war a chance, and bring peace.
Sri Lankan Insurgency and Boko Haram
Moreover, historians might argue that Sri Lanka’s military victory is not so unique. In Nigeria, the government forces have fought counter-insurgency (COIN) against Boko Haram. Boko Haram’s initial rebellion failed. However, after years of fighting, the insurgents became increasingly aggressive and started to control large areas in northeastern Nigeria just like what has happened in Sri Lanka during Elam war 1-3. The violence intensified dramatically in 2014, with 10,849 deaths, while Boko Haram intensely expanded its borders. Later, the insurgents were driven back during the West African Offensive a Nigeria-led coalition of African and Western states. Despite setbacks, the government launched new offensives in 2018 and 2019 against Boko Haram and (Islamic State’s West Africa Province) ISWAP. However, unlike Sri Lanka’s total absence of violence for one decade, it is reported the insurgents are known to have grow in strength.
Sri Lankan Insurgency and Huk Insurgency in Philippine
Similarly, historians could also point to the Huk insurgency in Philippine and Magsaysay and his American adviser had stopped the Communist insurgency in its tracks, within 18 months after taking office. The Huk insurgency in the Philippines was a perfect popular uprising that had begun during the war to disturb the Japanese occupation. Magsaysay and his U.S. consultant eliminated the insurgency by applying even more popular measures; blend with police-style battle tactics. The eventual defeat of the Huk insurrection in 1953 was largely the work of one of the greatest political-military combinations in modern history. There may be vanquished insurgencies in the world, but there is no equivalent in the modern world, for the more complete and comprehensive defeat of large-scale insurgency, often in semi- conventional warfare, which had lasted for decades.
To be continued
