Introduction
The reported attacks against King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on 8, 9 and 10 October 2026, followed by reports of a further projectile striking the airport on 11 October, raise questions that extend considerably beyond the immediate military confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi movement in Yemen. They concern the integrity of international civil aviation, the protection of civilian life during armed conflict, the responsibility of non-State armed groups under international law, the circumstances in which a State may be held accountable for the conduct of such groups, and the availability of meaningful compensation to those injured and the dependents of those killed. They also expose a structural deficiency in the international legal order: although international law contains rules prohibiting attacks upon civilians and regulating the conduct of hostilities, it does not provide a comprehensive and universally accessible compensation mechanism for victims of attacks committed by non-State armed actors.
The reported chronology suggests an escalation from earlier strikes to a particularly devastating incident on 10 October, when at least 12 persons were reportedly killed and approximately 309 injured. The victims included nationals of several countries, among them a United States citizen and an Egyptian flight attendant. Reports also indicated that airport operations were suspended, flights were diverted, and passengers were warned against travelling to Riyadh. A further report on 11 October described a projectile striking Terminal 4 and causing a fire. The precise circumstances, weapons used, targets intended, and casualty figures must be established through competent investigation; nevertheless, the reported sequence presents a compelling case for treating the incidents as a connected threat to civil aviation rather than as isolated military events.
The significance of an international airport in this context cannot be overstated. An airport is not merely a collection of runways, terminals and navigational facilities. It is an essential node in a global network of human mobility, commerce, diplomacy and economic interdependence. Its vulnerability exposes passengers, employees, airline personnel, airport workers and members of the public to risks that may originate far beyond the airport perimeter. When an airport is subjected to repeated attacks, the consequences extend to the confidence upon which international air transport depends. The question that emerges is whether the international community possesses sufficiently coherent legal and institutional arrangements to protect civil aviation when the threat emanates from an organized armed group rather than from a conventional State military force.
The legal character of an attack upon an international airport
The first inquiry must be directed towards the legal status of the airport and the circumstances in which it was attacked. International humanitarian law, which governs the conduct of hostilities during armed conflict, rests upon the fundamental distinction between military objectives and civilian objects. An international airport is not automatically a lawful military target merely because it is situated in a national capital, possesses strategic importance or contributes to the economic functioning of a State. Equally, its designation as a civilian airport does not necessarily render every component of the facility immune from attack in all circumstances.
The relevant principles are reflected in the Geneva Conventions and, particularly, Articles 48, 51, 52 and 57 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, together with applicable customary international humanitarian law. Parties to armed conflict must distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. An object ordinarily devoted to civilian aviation may become a military objective if, by its nature, location, purpose or use, it makes an effective contribution to military action and its destruction, capture or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. That determination requires evidence, not conjecture.
Even where a military objective exists, the principles of proportionality and precaution remain applicable. An attack is prohibited where the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Parties must also take feasible precautions to avoid or minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. These obligations are not displaced by the strategic importance of the target, the intensity of the conflict or the identity of the party conducting the attack.
Consequently, the reported deaths and injuries at Riyadh airport are a matter of grave concern, but they do not, without further evidence, establish every element of an internationally wrongful attack or a war crime. An investigation must determine whether the airport or a particular facility was being used for military purposes, what target the attackers intended to strike, what civilian presence was foreseeable, and what information was available when the attack was planned and executed. If the attack was deliberately directed against civilians or a civilian object that did not constitute a military objective, it could amount to a serious violation of international humanitarian law and, where the requisite elements are established, a war crime.
A declaration by an armed group that an entire national airspace or the airports within it constitute a theatre of operations cannot alter these legal principles. A party to an armed conflict cannot create a lawful military objective merely by announcing its intention to attack it. Nor can a warning to passengers that an airport is exposed to targeting absolve the party issuing the warning of its obligations under international law. The legal character of an object is determined by the applicable rules and the facts, not by unilateral designation.
It is equally important to recognize that international humanitarian law is not confined to relations between States. Organized armed groups are bound by applicable rules governing the conduct of hostilities, even though they are not States and cannot become parties to every international treaty in the same manner as sovereign governments. Their non-State character does not confer immunity from legal responsibility. Individuals who plan, order or execute unlawful attacks may incur criminal responsibility where the applicable jurisdictional and substantive requirements are satisfied. The possible responsibility of commanders must also be examined under the relevant rules governing orders, participation and command responsibility.
The responsibilities of ICAO, ACI and IATA
The institutional response must begin with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for the development of international civil aviation. The Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944, commonly known as the Chicago Convention, establishes the legal and institutional foundation upon which international civil aviation operates. Article 1 recognizes each State’s complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, while Article 3 distinguishes State aircraft from civil aircraft. Article 44 identifies ICAO’s objectives, including the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation and the promotion of safety in international air navigation.
These provisions establish the framework within which States exercise their responsibilities for civil aviation, but they should not be misconstrued as creating a universal compensation regime for victims of armed attacks upon airports. Nor does the Chicago Convention confer upon ICAO military enforcement power enabling it to prevent missiles from being launched against a civilian airport. ICAO’s contribution lies principally in developing international standards, facilitating cooperation, promoting the exchange of safety information and encouraging States to discharge their responsibilities for the safe conduct of international civil aviation.
Of particular relevance is ICAO Document 10084, the Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones. The manual assesses risks arising from armed conflict, including the presence of weapons capable of threatening civil aircraft, and provides guidance for decisions on flight operations over or near dangerous areas. Its significance in the Riyadh situation lies in the need to assess the threat dynamically. Where an airport is subjected to repeated attacks, an assessment conducted before the first incident cannot necessarily remain adequate after subsequent strikes demonstrate a change in the nature or intensity of the threat.
ICAO Annex 17, Security, is equally relevant. It establishes international Standards and Recommended Practices concerning the protection of international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. The associated Aviation Security Manual, ICAO Document 8973, provides more detailed implementation guidance, although access to that document is restricted. These instruments are important to the development of airport security arrangements, the protection of civil aviation infrastructure and the coordination of preventive measures. Their limitations must nevertheless be acknowledged: airport security screening, access controls and conventional perimeter protection cannot, by themselves, eliminate the threat posed by missiles or other weapons launched from outside airport boundaries.
The appropriate response is therefore not to assume that an attack necessarily demonstrates a breach of an ICAO standard, but to examine whether the competent authorities assessed the available intelligence, communicated material risks, implemented appropriate security measures and coordinated their responses in accordance with applicable obligations. Saudi Arabia retains responsibility for the administration of its airspace and the regulation of civil aviation within its jurisdiction. Airlines and other operators must also assess the risks relevant to their operations. ICAO can facilitate coordination and provide guidance, but it cannot substitute for the operational decisions of States and aircraft operators.
The Airports Council International (ACI) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) contribute to this framework from different institutional perspectives. ACI represents airport interests and promotes operational practices concerning airport management, emergency preparedness, security and recovery. Its emergency-planning resources and Airport Excellence programme are relevant to the coordination of airport emergency services, medical assistance, evacuation procedures, protection of personnel and restoration of operations following an incident. An attack upon a passenger terminal requires an integrated response involving airport management, fire and rescue services, hospitals, airlines and public authorities. The adequacy of that response must be assessed against the actual circumstances, the resources available and the applicable legal requirements.
IATA, representing airlines, contributes through operational guidance and industry standards concerning security, risk management and flight operations. Its guidance on conflict-zone risks and airspace assessment is relevant to decisions about whether services should continue, be suspended or be diverted. An airline cannot reasonably treat the mere absence of an official airspace closure as conclusive evidence that an operation is safe. It must consider credible threat information, the likely exposure of passengers and crew, the availability of alternative routes and the consequences of continuing to operate.
The distinction between institutional guidance and legal obligation is essential. ICAO, ACI and IATA do not constitute three interchangeable enforcement authorities. ICAO operates within an intergovernmental treaty framework; ACI and IATA provide industry representation, expertise and operational guidance. Their publications may inform the assessment of reasonable practice, but their legal significance depends upon the particular instrument, its status and the circumstances in which it is invoked. None of these organisations possesses a general mandate to compensate victims of a missile attack.
Compensation: the unresolved predicament of victims and dependents
The most immediate humanitarian question concerns those who have suffered death, bodily injury or loss of livelihood. Where a passenger, an airline employee or an airport worker is killed, the consequences extend to dependents who may have relied upon that person’s income and care. Those injured may face continuing medical expenses, loss of earnings, disability and psychological trauma. It is therefore insufficient to approach the incidents exclusively through the language of security, military retaliation and diplomatic condemnation. The question of reparation must form part of the international response.
The first potential source of liability is the perpetrator. Depending upon the applicable law and the jurisdiction of a competent court, claims may be brought against identifiable individuals or entities legally responsible for the attack. Such claims could encompass death, personal injury and other legally recoverable losses. The practical obstacles, however, are considerable. The claimant must establish a legal basis for liability, identify an appropriate defendant, prove causation and quantify the loss. Even where liability is established, enforcement may be impossible if the defendant has no accessible assets or if jurisdictional barriers prevent effective proceedings.
International humanitarian law prohibits specified forms of unlawful conduct during armed conflict, but it does not establish a comprehensive, universally accessible compensation fund against non-State armed groups for every resulting injury. The existence of substantive prohibition and the availability of an effective civil remedy are distinct matters. This distinction exposes a troubling gap between the international community’s capacity to articulate the rights of victims and its capacity to secure actual payment.
Saudi Arabia may provide emergency medical treatment, humanitarian assistance or financial support under applicable domestic arrangements. Whether victims are entitled to particular payments depends upon the existence and terms of relevant legislation, insurance schemes or government programmes. A claim may also arise against an airport operator, public authority or other party if evidence establishes a legally actionable failure that caused or materially contributed to the injury. Such liability cannot be presumed simply because an attack occurred within the State’s territory.
The position of airlines requires a separate analysis under the Montreal Convention of 1999. Article 17(1) establishes the conditions under which an air carrier is liable for a passenger’s death or bodily injury, provided the accident causing the damage occurred on board the aircraft or during the operations of embarking or disembarking. The Convention does not create a general right to compensation for everyone injured anywhere within an airport complex. A passenger injured in the course of embarking or disembarking may have a claim if the relevant conditions are satisfied. A visitor in a public terminal or an employee injured away from aircraft operations cannot automatically invoke Article 17 merely because the incident occurred at an international airport.
The precise circumstances are therefore decisive. The location of the victim, the activity being undertaken, the nature of the injury and the causal relationship between the event and the damage must be examined. The fact that a third party deliberately caused the injury does not, by itself, determine every question of carrier liability. Equally, the existence of an armed attack does not make an airline automatically liable for all resulting casualties.
Other avenues may include employment-related benefits, workers’ compensation, personal accident insurance and claims against responsible third parties under domestic law. Insurance policies may cover some losses while excluding others, particularly where war-risk provisions apply. Property insurance, business-interruption cover and personal-injury compensation must not be conflated, since they address different risks and interests.
The position of the dependents of deceased victims deserves particular attention. Their claims may include funeral expenses, loss of financial support and other heads of damage recognized by the applicable law. The fact that a victim was a foreign national should not, in itself, make that person’s loss less deserving of recognition. Saudi Arabia and the victims’ home States could cooperate to establish a centralized process for recording casualties, preserving evidence, identifying available benefits and assisting claimants in accessing competent courts and insurers.
Such assistance would not require the premature attribution of legal responsibility to any particular State. Nor would it absolve the perpetrators of responsibility. A properly designed victim-support arrangement could provide immediate humanitarian assistance while preserving the rights of injured persons and dependants to pursue claims against legally responsible individuals or entities.
State responsibility and the position of the United Nations
The fact that the attacks are attributed to a non-State armed group complicates, but does not eliminate, the question of State responsibility. Under the general law of State responsibility, reflected in the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the conduct of an armed group is not automatically attributable to a State merely because that State supplies weapons, provides funding or expresses political support.
Article 8 addresses conduct carried out on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, a State. Whether that test is satisfied requires examination of the relevant evidence and the applicable jurisprudence. Evidence of external assistance may be relevant to other legal questions, but it does not automatically establish that every operation conducted by the recipient group is legally attributable to the assisting State.
Accordingly, allegations that Iran supports the Houthis cannot, without further evidence, establish that Iran is internationally responsible for the attacks upon Riyadh airport. Nor does the presence of an armed group within Yemen’s territory automatically make its conduct attributable to the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Attribution must be distinguished from a State’s possible responsibility for its own acts or omissions under an independently applicable international obligation. Such responsibility requires identification of the relevant obligation and proof of its breach; it cannot be inferred solely from the occurrence of an attack.
Where State responsibility is established, the ordinary consequences of an internationally wrongful act may include cessation, appropriate assurances of non-repetition and full reparation for the injury caused. Reparation may encompass compensation, restitution or satisfaction, depending upon the circumstances. These principles, however, do not permit a victim or a State to demand compensation from an allegedly supporting State without establishing the necessary legal basis for responsibility.
The United Nations offers a further avenue for action. The Security Council may determine that a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security and may adopt measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Depending upon the circumstances, those measures could include demands for the cessation of attacks, targeted sanctions, enforcement of applicable arms restrictions or other measures directed towards preventing further violence. The Council could also request reporting, encourage cooperation in preserving evidence and support diplomatic efforts to reduce the risk of escalation.
The Secretary-General may employ good offices, support mediation and draw attention to violations of international law. UN humanitarian bodies may assist in coordinating relief, while an appropriately mandated fact-finding mechanism could help establish the circumstances of the attacks and preserve evidence for subsequent proceedings.
The judicial avenues are more limited. The International Court of Justice generally adjudicates disputes between States where a basis of jurisdiction exists; it does not prosecute individual Houthi commanders. The International Criminal Court prosecutes individuals for crimes within its jurisdiction, but its jurisdiction is not universal. Territorial and nationality requirements, any applicable acceptance of jurisdiction and the possibility of a Security Council referral would have to be examined. Neither the gravity of an attack nor its condemnation by the international community automatically establishes the Court’s jurisdiction.
The United Nations is therefore neither powerless nor omnipotent. Its effectiveness depends upon the Charter, the applicable legal framework and, particularly in the Security Council, the political will of its members. Nevertheless, repeated attacks upon an international airport provide a compelling reason for coordinated diplomatic engagement, rigorous investigation and a sustained effort to ensure that the protection of civilians is not subordinated to the strategic calculations of the parties.
My Take
The Riyadh airport attacks expose a fundamental asymmetry in the international legal order. The international community has developed an elaborate body of law governing civil aviation, the conduct of hostilities and the protection of civilians, yet the practical consequences of a deliberate attack may fall disproportionately upon those least capable of securing a remedy. The passenger killed in a terminal, the flight attendant whose working environment becomes a battlefield, the airport employee permanently injured and the child who loses a parent may all possess legitimate claims to recognition and reparation. What they may not possess is an effective legal avenue through which those claims can be converted into compensation.
This is not an argument for diminishing the importance of established rules of State responsibility or the principles of jurisdiction. It is an argument for recognizing that the enforcement of international law must be measured not only by the precision of its doctrines but also by its capacity to protect human beings in circumstances where conventional legal remedies are inadequate. A system that condemns an unlawful attack but leaves its victims without a realistic prospect of compensation has fulfilled only part of its purpose.
I would therefore propose that ICAO, in cooperation with States, ACI, IATA and relevant United Nations bodies, consider developing an international framework for responding to attacks against civil aviation infrastructure by non-State armed groups. Such a framework should not purport to create powers that these institutions do not possess. It should instead establish protocols for coordinated investigation, preservation of evidence, casualty identification, communication of security risks and the assessment of compensation avenues. It should also examine the feasibility of an emergency victim-assistance mechanism capable of providing immediate support while questions of legal responsibility are investigated. The mechanism’s financing, eligibility criteria, relationship with existing insurance arrangements and rights of recourse against responsible parties would require careful negotiation.
The purpose would be to bridge the distance between humanitarian necessity and legal accountability. Immediate assistance should not depend upon the successful completion of complex proceedings concerning attribution, jurisdiction or the criminal responsibility of individual perpetrators. Equally, the provision of assistance should not extinguish legitimate claims against those ultimately found responsible.
There is also a compelling need to reconsider how the international civil aviation community approaches conflict-zone risk. The continued operation of an airport or the formal availability of an air route cannot be treated as conclusive evidence of safety when repeated attacks demonstrate that the underlying risk has materially changed. States must communicate credible threats; airlines must exercise independent operational judgment; airport operators must maintain effective emergency arrangements; and ICAO must continue to facilitate international cooperation within its mandate. The objective is not to eliminate every risk, which would be impossible, but to ensure that foreseeable dangers are assessed responsibly and that human life remains the governing consideration.
Finally, the United Nations must resist the temptation to treat condemnation as an adequate response. Where evidence indicates deliberate attacks upon civilians or civilian objects, the international community should pursue a legally grounded investigation, preserve the possibility of individual criminal accountability and examine whether further measures are necessary to prevent recurrence. At the same time, it must avoid attributing responsibility to a State merely because that State is alleged to support the armed group concerned. The credibility of international law depends upon both its willingness to confront violations and its fidelity to the evidentiary standards through which responsibility is established.
The attacks upon Riyadh airport, if the reported facts are confirmed, are a reminder that civil aviation cannot be insulated from the consequences of geopolitical conflict merely by virtue of its international character. Airports exist to connect societies, not to become instruments through which civilian populations are intimidated or collective economic life disrupted. The protection of international civil aviation must therefore be understood as a shared legal and humanitarian responsibility.
My ultimate position is that the international community must move beyond the familiar sequence of attack, condemnation and retaliation. It must develop a more coherent response in which prevention, accountability and compensation are treated as complementary obligations of responsible governance. The true measure of international aviation law is not simply whether it can identify the rules violated when an airport is attacked. It is whether those rules can help prevent the next attack, establish responsibility when violations occur and ensure that the innocent are not left to bear, alone and without remedy, the human cost of a conflict they did not choose.
