On December 2, 2025, Pakistan and Türkiye signed five Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and Deeds of Assignment (DoAs) focused on oil and gas exploration, while agreeing to broaden cooperation to mining and equity participation in the power sector. The agreements were concluded during a visit by a Turkish delegation led by Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, who met Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir, Petroleum Minister Ali Pervaiz Malik, and Power Minister Awais Leghari. Specific documents included the Deed of Assignment for Eastern Offshore Indus-C and Petroleum Concession Agreements for Ziarat North, Sukhpur-II, Deep C, and Offshore Deep F blocks.
This is not the first high-profile signing spree. In November 2022, during the 7th Pakistan-Türkiye High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in Islamabad, another five MoUs were inked, underscoring deepening ties in defense, economy, and culture. In June 2022, Prime Minister Sharif and President Erdo?an had set an ambitious target to raise bilateral trade from $1.1 billion to $5 billion within three years; by 2024, trade had inched only to $1.4 billion. The latest agreements thus serve primarily as a reaffirmation of intent, with energy cooperation now the centerpiece.
The December 2 accords commit both countries to:
- Establishing a joint trading company for petroleum procurement;
- Expanding collaboration in energy, petroleum, and minerals, with Turkish Petroleum already active in Pakistan’s onshore and offshore exploration;
- Pursuing further joint ventures in oil and gas, energy infrastructure, and mining, including Turkish private-sector participation in the upcoming privatization of Pakistan’s first three power distribution companies (Discomps).
Pakistan’s oil and gas reserves are overwhelmingly concentrated in Balochistan and its offshore waters-a province already seething with separatist insurgency. Groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), and others view all foreign resource projects as neo-colonial exploitation that extracts wealth, alters demographics through outsider influx, and leaves locals impoverished. China, via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) launched in 2013, has long been the primary target of this ire. Yet the United States is also maneuvering to enter Balochistan’s rare-earth and mineral sector, prompting sharp rebukes from insurgents.
On August 26, 2025, the BLF renewed its call for international support in what it termed the “Baloch national war of liberation,” framing its campaign as defensive resistance for self-determination and condemning fresh U.S. mining agreements with Islamabad. Earlier, in April 2025, the Baloch National Movement (BNM) explicitly warned foreign companies to stay away, declaring any deals signed with Pakistani authorities in Islamabad null and void.
Since CPEC’s inception, Balochistan has become a persistent battlefield. A May 2024 Interior Ministry report recorded 62 deaths in eight attacks on CPEC workers between 2020 and 2024 across Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. By December 10, 2024, the National Counter Terrorism Authority documented 14 attacks since 2021 that killed 20 Chinese and eight Pakistani nationals, injuring 34 Chinese and 25 Pakistanis.
Although no attacks on Chinese interests were recorded in 2025 up to early December, the longer-term pattern is grim. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal data (up to December 4, 2025), at least 17 attacks targeting Chinese nationals since July 2007 have killed 87 people (19 Chinese, 13 Pakistani security personnel, 42 Pakistani civilians, 13 attackers) and injured 66 others (including six Chinese). Twelve of these incidents occurred in Balochistan.
Beyond direct assaults on personnel, Baloch insurgents routinely sabotage energy infrastructure. Since March 2000, they have executed at least 273 attacks on gas pipelines, oil tankers, and installations, causing 46 deaths and 45 injuries. Casualties remain low because the primary objective is economic disruption-particularly to protest what insurgents see as the unfair diversion of Balochistan’s natural gas to Punjab without commensurate local benefits.
The new Turkish agreements, combined with potential U.S. mineral deals, intensify an already fierce international scramble for Balochistan’s resources. More foreign flags planted in the province will almost certainly be interpreted by separatists as further proof of occupation and plunder. Heightened competition among multinational corporations risks accelerating both resentment and violence.
In short, Islamabad and Ankara may celebrate their energy partnership as a strategic triumph, but in Balochistan the sound of pen on paper in Islamabad is increasingly heard as the drumbeat of another cycle of insurgency. What looks like a fast-track to energy security from the federal capital appears, from the province, as a fast-track to tragedy.
